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CATASTROPHIC DAMAGE FROM DAM-BREAK FLOODS

I.

PROBLEM DEFINITION AND STUDY PURPOSES

Even as technological advances improve soc ial weI fare, more people are
exposed to disastrous technological failures.
The standard of living in the
United States is higher than ever before, but our country also stands in
significant danger of disaster events of far
er scope than any previously
experienced. The flooding that would be caused by the failure of a major dam
~s one example.
Asses sment 0 f these low-prob ab i 1 ity/high-consequence event s requires
quantification of both probabilities and consequences.
Considerable work has
been done on the former (Rowe 1977, Waller and Covello 1984), but relatively
little attention has been given to estimating the consequences of disasters
that impact thousands of people. Society has increasing cause to plan against
a really large disaster event where losses of life may approach millions and
economic damage may be in billions of dollars. This study may be viewed as an
exploratory venture in moving from the occupant or building to the community
and (to a lesser degree) on to the regional scale in damage estimation.
When a few properties are damaged by flood, fire, or strong wind, the
repair requirements can be tabulated and used to est imate the loss (whether
economic or expanded to a more broadly based utility function) to the occupant
or owner.
The risk expectations of individuals and communities, and
consequent ly most risk reduct ion and risk avoidance programs, are based on
losses at this scale.
When thousands of propert ies are damaged, the same tabulation and
estimating relationships would severely understate the loss to the community.
The lo'ss from the simultaneous dest ruct ion of 1000s of homes exceeds 1000
times that from the destruction of just one.
The ability of an economy to
"self insure" by moving resources from individuals who are not impacted to
those who are
limited by repair capac ity and mobi 1 ity constraints.
The
impact has been scaled upwards from the occupant to the community level.
Exactly what causes this magnification? How large is it? How might one
estimate the amount to expect from a given catastrophe? What magnification
magn i tude might one expect from a major dam break?
The purpose of th is
exploratory study is to review historical records on catastrophes and their
impacts, identify the major impacting processes, and examine the literature on
these processes in order to:
1. Conceptual ize the principal processes
losses resulting from a dam-break flood,

that

could magnify disaster

2. Identify indicators to watch in determining which processes wi 11 be
activated and estimate how much magnification will occur,
3. Approximate the order of magnitude of magnification likely to be
caused by the worst conceivable dam break scenario in the United States,
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4. Suggest scal ing studies
resources planning.

for

quantifying catastrophic

loss

for water

The approach is to probe the spec.i fics of what losses are and how they
occur during a catastrophe.
Past efforts to define catastrophe have largely
overlooked the dynamics of the interacting processes over the duration of a
disaster and the changes in these interact ion associated wi th larger scale
d i sas ters.
The goal is to expand from past conceptual i zat ions featuring
soc ietal recognit ion (Rowe 1977) to a reconnaissance assessment to st imula te
critical thinking on the processes causing upwards scaling of losses from low
probability/high-consequence events.
Ideas are offered for future study
rather. than refined for scientific scrutiny.
II. A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSMENT
A. Time frames.
Our starting assumption is that the magnification
largeLy results from dynamic synergistic interaction of disaster impact
processes.
According to our characterization, losses (active impacts) and
recovery (reactive impacts) occur over time.
The event begi.ns with a massive
negative impact during a relatively short period.
Its aftermath is extended
by positively reinforcing feedback mechanisms (Forrester 1970) over a much
longer period of continuing deterioration.
Recovery begins during the event
and reduces and eventually eliminates the losses through positively
reinforcing feedback mechanisms. At the end, the restoration may even improve
the community.
The damage occurs as physical, environmental, and social system fail to
function in their accustomed manner. Losses are summed over a disaster period
from the beginning of the event until the completion of the recovery.
The
individual losses stem from lost income or lost utility with respect to
environmental or social values within this disaster period. Where justified,
they can be ameliorated by repair or restoration (should the property be
beyond repair) investments.
The negative dynamic interactions add to the
losses or constrain the recovery during the disaster period.
The positive
interactions work in the opposite direction.
B. Scaling.
Impact magnification is analogous to scale effects in
physics, meteorology, and hydrology in that the same principles can be applied
for a better understanding of the upward sc al ing of socio-economic impacts.
In physics, for example, subatomic, atomic, pore, basin, continental, and
planetary studies address different processes.
Soc io-economic ally, the
processes to consider in estimating the losses from not being able to use and
the costs for repairing a damaged bui Lding are inappropriate for estimating
the. cost of J;"estoring a devastated city. Whether one is dealing with physical
or socio-economic systems,
1. The operational forces and interactions vary with scale.
Atmospheric circulation occurs at molecular, 'storm, and frontal scales.
People experience events as individuals and as members of communities,
regions, and nations. Economic interactions concentrate in defined trade
areas.
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2. Activity at smaller and at larger scales have consequences at the
scale of primary interest.
For example in estimating catastrophic loss
to a community, one must consider building repair costs at the property
scale and the state of the economy at the regional scale.
While the term "magnification" is introduced as a multiplier, the full
concept is for it to be a generic term that describes the increase in unit
losses as one goes from a disaster to a catastrophe without implying that the
losses are uniformly larger.
Some types of losses may decrease or disappear.
Others become larger.
Processes that did not even exist at a smaller scale
emerge and then begin to dominate at a larger scale.
Experience in the physical world suggests that larger scale processes are
slower and continue over a longer time period. For example, physics tells us
that processes occurring at large spatial scales take long per lods atom
movements are in units shorter than microseconds and stars hardly change their
positions in millennia.
[n fact, the time dimension is useful in classifying
factors contributing to catastrophic or super catastrophic losses.
Also, at
these larger scales, the longer time frames cause the dynam ic feedback
mechanisms to extend further into the future, become associated with greater
uncertainties, and have a greater spread in the probability distribution of
the potential impacts.
During larger scale events, losses and repairs move into different
frameworks.
Business and government communities are "damaged" in different
sorts of ways than are buildings; their failure to function properly inflicts
different sorts of losses, and they require different repair "measures."
Additional interactions must be considered in assessing the effects on
regional, state, and national economies and politics.
C. Definitions. [n order to examine loss "magnification," one must
The following terminology is
est a b 1 Ls h s om e bas i c terms of reference.
offered:
1. Disaster. The dictionary definition of a disaster is "any sudden
unfortunate event."
This study focuses on dam-break events.
However,
because dam-break catastrophes are rare (only 12 11 fe-taking events in
the United States since l870), other "natural" disasters were also
examined to add to the data base.
For this purpose, a natural disaster
is defined as one originating in natural sources as opposed to one caused
by people, accidentally or purposefully.
2. Dam-break. An event in which the failure or overtopping of a dam
passes a large volume of water downstream and produces a severe flood.
This study focuses on dam breaks associated with major hydrologic
events.
The large areas impacted by heavy rains are likely to give
hydrologic dam-breaks larger magnification than structural dam breaks.
3. Damage.
The dictionary definition of damage is "injury or harm
that impairs value or usefulness."
As now generally accepted in water
resources planning (Water Resources Council 1980), value will be examined
in three dimensions:
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a. Economic (measurable in monetary units),
b.
Social (measurable in changes in the social well-being and
particularly in the physical and mental health of people in ways
that cannot be fully expressed in monetary units).
c.
Environmental (measurable in changes to natural [chiefly
biologic or geologic] systems in ways that cannot be fully expressed
in monetary units).
4 . Cat as t r 0 ph e •
Th e d i c t ion a r y de fi nit ion 0 f cat a s t ro phe is
"widespread disaster."
This study makes that de finit ion quant i tat ively
specific by interpreting Ilwidespread ll as an event large enough for
damages to magni fy beyond linear addit ion because addit ional processes
occur at the community scale.
5. Super catast rophe.
An event large enough for catastrophic
damages to magnify beyond linear addition because still additional
processes occur at a still larger regional scale.
6. Normal damage.
The damage a disaster causes from a propertyscale per.spective can be estimated from the losses associated with
impaired use and the costs of implemented repair or replacement to better
meet occupant needs.
One can use unit costs to estimate the damages to
each property and sum the results to obtain a total "normal damage."
7. Magni fied damage.
Once an event crosses the threshold from a
disaster to a catastrophe, the actual total damage exceeds the sum of the
normal damages and can be called a "magnified damage." The communityscale perspective would add losses associated with:
a. Impaired community functions and the costs of reducing the
impairment and restoring the functions.
b. Magnification of "normal" losses and repair costs because of the
impaired community functions.
8. Property Scale. Assessment of the impacts of a disaster from the
first order perspective of an individual, a property under single
ownership, or some other unit of equivalent size in the environmental and
social dimensions.
9. Community Scale. Assessment of the impacts of a catastrophe from
the second order perspective of a larger community.
10. Regional Scale.
Assessment of the impacts
catastrophe from a third order regional perspective.

of

a

super

10. Scaling Threshold.
The disaster size at which magnification
begins. This size varies with the type of damage and is much larger in
going from the community to the regional scale than in going from the
property to the community scale. Threshold magnitudes must be determined
empirically.
11. Magni ficat ion.
The transform used to convert an es t imate of
normal or property-scale damage to magnified or community-scale damage.
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Simplistically, one could define "magnified damage ll divided by "normal
damage" as the magnification factor.
Realistically, the transform is
more complex.
12. Super Magnification. The transform used to convert an estimate
of community-scale damage to regional-scale damage.
13. Severity. The dictionary definition of severity is "harshness."
As applied in this study, severity is a scaler measure of dam-break
flooding harshness that can be used in estimating normal damage (loss at
the property scale).
14. Severity factors.
Factors used to estimate severity. The
factors commonly used for estimating flood damages are the depth and area
of floodi.ng, the value and kinds of property at risk, the suddenness of
the event, and flood velocity, sediment content, and duration.

15. Property-scale occupancy. Normal flood damage is estimated by
integrat i ng spat ially-distributed informat ion on severity factors over
spatially-distributed information on flood-plain occupancy.
At the
property scale, this information would be descriptions and values of
properties by flood-plain location.
16. Synergism.
The diet ionary defin i t ion of synerg 1sm 1S "working
together cooperatively." As applied in this study, synergism encompasses
interactions among property-scale and community-scale processes.
11. Synergistic factors (Scaling indices).
Factors used to index
whether larger scale impacts will occur and the amount of magnification.
Specific factors may be physical, economic, social, or environmental.
They are found in propert i es of the event averaged over community-scale
areas.
18.
Community-scale occupancy.
Magnified flood damage would be
estimated by integrating information on synergistic factors over
descriptive information on community juxtaposition with respect to the
hazard.
At the community scale, occupancy information includes
descriptions of community land use, the distribution of community service
hubs with respect to the hazard, and the spatial distribution of the
communication and transportation systems.

19. Regional synergism. At the higher scaling boundary, regional
synergism encompasses interactions among community-scale and regionalscale processes.
20.
Regional synergistic factors (Regional scaling indices>.
Factors used to index whether regional-scale impacts occur and the amount
of consequent magnification. Specific factors are found in properties of
the event averaged over regional-scale areas.
21.
Regional-scale occupancy.
Super magni fied flood damage would
be estimated by integrating information on regional synergist ic factors
over descriptive information on the juxtaposition of the hazard within
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the region. This information would cover regional size, the distribution
of reg i ona 1 func t ions, and regional communicat ion and tr ansportati on
systems.
D. Damage Classification.
Damages defined as impairments in achieving
are appropriately classified by goal.
The Principles and Standards
(~vater Resources Council 1980) provide the goal c1assificat ion most widely
recognized for water resources planning and which contains the following ten
economic, environmental, and social goals:
goats

Economic Domain.
Gl:
Economic Value.
Beneficial and adverse impacts that can be
fairly measured in monetary units.
Environmental Domain.
G2:
Ecologic Value. Impacts on populations of species that can be
predicted from biological interrelationships and whose worth depends
on the role of those species in the total environment.
G3:
Aesthetic Value.
Impacts on views, sounds, and scents
perceived by humans that can be predicted from physical, chemical,
and biological relationships and whose worth depends on the
preferences of the people affected.
G4:
Historic Value.
Impacts on historical, cultural, or religious
sites that can be predicted from juxtapositions between impacts and
sites and whose worth depends on the values people, now and in the
future, place on the sites.
G5:
Scientific Value.
Impacts on areas that are being or can be
used for scientific studies because of their special features or
long record of collected data that can be predicted from juxtapositions between impacts and sites and whose worth depends on the
values science, now and in the future, places on the sites.
G6:
Pristine value.
Impacts on opportunities for people to
experience settings that are essentially unaltered by human activity
and that can be predicted from juxtapositions between impacts and
sites and whose worth depends on the values people, now and in the
future, place on the sites.
Social Domain.
G7:
Real Incomes.
Adjustments to account for exchanges of goods
and services that do not invo lve money and for di fferences in the
utility of money among peoples of different income or different life
styles.
G8:
Health.
Impacts on mental and physical health and safety and
measured in numbers of people motivated to greater achievement or
harmed, classified by degrees.
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G9:
Educational Opportunities.
Impacts on the educational,
cultural, and recreational opportun1t~es for the population of a
region and measured in numbers of people helped or deprived,
classified by degrees.
GIO: Emergency Preparedness.
Impacts on military and police
operat ions and on evacuat ions in civil emergencies and measured in
types of interference, classified by degrees.
E. Indirect Impacts.
Many interactive and long-term impacts cannot be
neatly classified among these goals defined for property-scale analysis. An
alternative approach to their examination would be to consider how a major dam
failure would i.mpact the engineeri.ng, financial, environmental, social,
political, and legal feasibility of subsequent water resources projects and
related public works. For example, a major failure could cause:

1. Technically unnecessary engineering design standards
all dams more costly.

that make

2. Greater difficulty tn funding, whether by taxes or through
financial markets, perceived "hazardouslt facilities.
At a time when
Federal agencies are moving toward joint financ ing, the difficult ies in
establish ing innovat iva fund ing consort ia wi 11 increase.
Water proj ect
services will deteriorate.
3. Politicians to become tess likely to support dam projects, as has
happened to nuclear power, and perhaps, at the super catastrophe scale,
efforts to abolish water resources construction agencies altogether.
This would force essential water resources development and management
activity back to a more expensive local responsibility.
4. Laws that restrain dam building, directly or by excessive
bureaucratic regulation, or that assign so much liability that few are
willing to take the risk.
III.

HISTORICAL DESCRIPTIONS AND TOPIC REVIEWS

Empirical observations of historical natural catastrophes were used as a
starting source of information for identifying magnification effects.
Contemporary records and later descri pt ions 0 f nat ura 1 catas t rophes and
assessments of what went on from a scientific perspective were searched for
indications of the nature and magnitude of scale effects.
A. Criteria for event review.
1. Emphasis was placed on catastrophes that have occurred in
recent years in order to have a reasonable match with present
technological and socioeconomic conditions.
2. Emphasis was placed on catastrophes in the United States.
Catastrophes abroad were considered in locations expected to have
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similar socioeconomic impacts because of similar cultural, economic,
and transportation settings.
3. The rev iews 0 f dam- fa i 1 ure events looked at both the
physical impacts and the consequences growing out of those impacts.
Other kinds of disasters were examined for information useful in
understanding.
B. Selected historical events.
Following the above criteria, data were
collected describing the following events:
1. Historical disasters
with dambreaks:

in the United States not

associated

a. Galveston, Texas, hurricane, September 8, 1900.
b. The San Franc isco, California, earthquake and
18, 1906.

fire,

April

c. Hurricane Camille, Mississippi Coast, Aug. 17-18, 1969.
d. Hurricane Agnes, June 19-29, 1972.
e. Regional floods and debris flows,
Cali fornia, January, 1982.

San Francisco Bay area,

2. The historical dambreak floods since t870 1.n the Uni ted
States that were severe enough to cause loss of life were:
a. May 16, 1874; Mill River, MA, 143 deaths.
b. May 31, 1889; Johnstown, PA, 2209 deaths.
c. Feb 22, 1890; Walnut Grove, AZ, 150 deaths.
d. Sep 30, 1911; Austin, PA, 80 deaths.
e. Jan 27, 1916; Lower Otay, CA, 30 deaths.
f. Mar 12, 1928; St. Francis, CA, 450 deaths.
g. Dec 14, 1963; Baldwin Hills, CA, 5 deaths.
h. Feb 26, 1972 ; Buffalo Creek, W, 125 deaths.

1. Jun

9, 1972 ; Rapid City, SD, 237 deaths.

j. Feb 22, 1976; Bearwallow, NC, 5 deaths.

k. Jun

5, 1976; Teton, ID, 14 deaths.

1. Nov

6, 1977 ; Taccoa Falls, GA, 39 deaths.
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Al together, about 3500 lives were lost 1n these 12 events (Baldewicz
The dambreaks at Johnstown, St. Francis, Buffalo Creek, and
1984, p. 83 ).
Rapid City are described in Appendix I.
3. The historical events overseas covered were:
a. Flash river flood, Lynmouth, England, August 15, 1952.
b. Floods in Bristol, England, July II, 1970.
c. Australian floods (Lismore NSW and Brisbane) of 1974.
These events were selected because descriptions by social scientists or
historians provided useful insights to understanding "community-scale" flood
damage.
In format ion from the hi storical records on the 12 selected events is
summarized in Appendix I in chronological order of event occurrence.
The
journalistic accounts suggest what the people in the impacted communities
considered important.
The accounts of congressional efforts on behal f of
constituents and in debating disaster relief policy suggest what politicians
and government officials consider important.
Author comments (impressions)
are added within the Appendix and developed within the text to follow.
C.
Criteria for topic review.
Many of the concepts developed 1n the
body of this report and observation from the historical records in Appendix I
suggested literature searches for work that others have done on noted or
related topics.
These were pursued in accordance with their relevance and
central ity to the magnificat ion processes seen originally or introduced by
considerations that came to light during the review of the historical events.
D. Selected review topics.
Appendix rr abstracts information gleaned
from SCholarly articles, trade journals. and other literature.
The topics
searched were:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Dam safety.
Rebuilding and relocation.
Repair cost escalation.
Health impacts.
Psychological impacts.
Preventative response.
Disaster planning by businesses.
Areal extent .of probable maX1mum precipitation.

IV. PROCESS-RELEVANT INFORMATION
The disaster period was defined above as having three stages. For a dam
failure example, the initial impact results as a wall of water roars down the
floodplain to bring sudden destruction.
An aftermath of economic,
environmental, and social interactions add losses in amounts that diminish
over time. Recovery processes heal the wounds. gradually at first but picking
up momentum over time.
Impact, aftermath and recovery processes interact in
magnifying disaster loss to catastrophic dimensions.
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The synergism seems to be largely a scale effect associated with discrete
boundaries as events cross thresholds that change process contexts and
interactive dynamics on a time scale.
Starting from this hypothesis, the
fo 11 owing structure was used to 1 ist processes occurring at the property
scale, note how those processes are affected by larger scale impacts, and
describe the new processes that emerge.
Processes Operating at the Property Scale
1. Health.
Disasters take lives, cause injuries, and spread disease.
Injuries are concentrated during the event and continue in lesser numbers (as
the result of induced accidents or losses of safety) through the aftermath and
recovery per iod s.
Disease may be spread by cold and exposure, the spread ing
of hazardous materials and vectors, or drinking water contamination.
Deaths
may be caused by either injury or disease; immediately or gradually. Recovery
involves rescue of the trapped or isolated, conveyance to places of warmth and
safety, and treatment to prevent death and speed recovery to good health.
The physical and psychological shock effect of a quick and unexpected
experience on the body's central nervous system reduces human ability to
function.
The lasting effect of this trauma adds to the losses as victims
fail to care for themselves during the aftermath and are less effective in
their recovery efforts.
The accounts of the Lynmouth flood (Append ix I)
describe numerous trauma situations and illustrate some of their impacts.
All of the historical accounts used deaths as the lead statist ic in
describing catastrophes.
Health concerns, associated with contamination of
the drinking water and the spread of toxic or disease-laden materials, were
also publicized.
Study is needed to determine how the publicity works to
inspire desirable publ ic caution or to feed fear and add to irrat ional
behavior.
Reported interviews during the aftermath period showed the most severe
lingering health problem to be the long term impacts of catastrophe
experiences and their consequenc.es on mental heal th.
The losses were
intensified by breakdowns in rescue and health services and the depressing
effects of losing social support and a familiar physical environment.
positive health effects occur during the recovery period.
A period of
major change opens many opportunities that feed optimism and good health. For
example, widespread devastation inspired creative reconstruction in San
Francisco in 1906 and Lynmouth in 1952.
2. Economic. Disasters damage property and disrupt income from land and
capital investments.
Cleanup delays add to the deterioration.
Individuals
with damaged property may do the best they can in the circumstances, restore
the property to its original condition, or replace the property in a way
better suited to changing needs or more commensurate with the revealed hazard.
Journalistic accounts generally estimated losses as a cost to restore or
substitute for lost physical facilities and expressed them in either dollars
or as a percentage of building value destroyed, absolute and relative measures
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respectively. Looting, charlatan help, and reneging Insurance companies were
noted as adding to the economic loss.
3. Personal.
The sudden destruction of a disaster deprives people of
many items of personal value that cannot be replaced through the market place.
Other items have known or market approximated values but are not replaceable.
Still others may be replaceable but beyond the means of the loser. Examples
listed in journalistic accounts included table china, diaries, and ledgers of
uncollected bills. These losses are less publicized than the first two in
contemporary accounts, but they are probably greater than many people indicate
publicly. Second to human beings, item of particular personal value generally
become the focus of evacuation and rescue activity.
Magnification of Property-Scale Losses by Community-Scale Processes

1. Health. Health losses are increased by interferences with rescue and
the efficient delivery of preventative and recuperative health services.
Corrnnunication and transport interruptions (or disruptions by converging
spectators) may delay bringing trained people and special equipment to the
disaster scene. Victims are forced to rely on poorly equipped or poorly
trained people.
Rescue shifts from targeted searches for known people to
massive scouting over large areas for cries for help or nameless bodies. The
delivery of massive health services is more impersonal and further from the
supporting roles of family and friends and thus more depressing to victims who
are left less able to make the mental adjustments required for speedy
recovery.
2. Economic loss. Aftermath events add to the cost of repair response to
catastrophe by interference and delay and thus force people into a longer
period of coping that also adds to their losses.
Retrospective studies
estimate numbers of lost jobs, a loss that is seldom reported in the news
accounts because of the difficulty in compiling statistics quiCkly.
3. Personal loss. Aftermath processes also interfere with the rescue of
personal property and consequently add to this loss. The magnification may be
greater here because the search and repair wi 11 often only be done by the
losers themselves, other activities may demand their time, and they may feel
unduly stressed by restrictions to their doing so.
Processes Operating at the Community Scale
1. Community Health.
Communities, as well as individuals, are
characterized by a state of well-being that suffers after major external
insults.
After a catastrophe, a community (take a person who has lost his
health) would devote more time and resources to recovery and function less
satisfactorily in normal activities.
Market processes may have to be
reestablished.
Inventories may be destroyed; labor arrangements may be
disrupted; and new business enterprises may have to be established. Everyone
benefiting from those services would suffer.

Community economies also experience damage to
2. Community Economics.
the capital investment 1.n their infrastructure.
Losses are due to less
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efficient operation during the aft ermath and recovery per iod s.
Repair
(perhaps by recruiting replacement capability from outside) is required.
3. Community Loss.
As a third part of this analogy, communities
experience loss of things their citizens value collectively.
In San
Francisco, civic pride suffered with the destruction of "some of the finest
buildings in the city."
The city, as a place visited, personally or
vicariously, lost identifiers of its character that could never be replaced.
"The heart and guts of one of the world's best loved cities were
gone" (Bronson 1959, p. 83).
Some mentioned items were art collections,
landmark buildings, and businesses that at tracted cl ientele from throughout
California.
At the community scale, the process involved sudden damage,
continuing loss as the city changed during restoration, and a recovery as a
new civic pride grew around the reconstructed city.
Vital and land records were destroyed at city hall in San Francisco. !fA
thousand tales remain untold. Conflicts in documentation, and there are many,
sprang from the fact that a single reporter was physically unable to see more
than a tiny part of what transpired" (Bronson 1959). The press responded to
public interest in how the rich and famous were affected by the disaster,
Enrico Caruso in San Francisco. Human interest stories were also common. For
example, six babies were delivered along Market Street in doorways or beneath
the trees during the day of the fire in San Francisco.
Additional Processes Observed in San Francisco
The 1906 San Francisco earthquake and fire was by most measures the most
severe catastrophe that the United States has experienced this century. The
following processes, observed during that disaster period, provide a base for
the impact analysis to follow.
1. Personal hardship was expressed in numbers of homeless, losses of and
deprivations of basic services such as electricity, water supply, markets for
purchasing daily needs, sanitation, etc.
Conflicts arose between official
efforts to effect orderly occupancy to supply these needs in refugee camps and
individual preferences for greater independence by living in scattered shanty
towns.
2. Communication breakdown. The interruption of communications with the
outside and within the area of impact reduces the ability of relief efforts to
concentrate on the right problems and causes tension for family and friends
1 iving elsewhere and want ing reports.
It restricts the informat ion base
available for personal planning by the victims. Within the isolated disaster
area, wild rumors begin to spread.
3. Transportation breakdown.
Transportation stoppages and delays,
frustrate the conveyance of essential food and supplies into the city and the
flight of outward bound refugees.
4. Loss of basic infrastructure:
water, electricity, health services.
Stopping the use of home plumbing and circulating instructions on digging and
maintaining latrine trenches.
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5. Disruption of special care facilities.
Inability to provide normal
care for the incapacitated or the incarcerated, the aged or the infirm.
Hospitals, prisons, insane asylums, and nursing homes have people who cannot
be cared for temporarily or who escape and harm themselves or others.

6. Relocations in different time frames.
The general catastrophe
scenario is first for people to flee to a place of safety, then to collect
more slowly in places of temporary shelter (standards for comfort increase
with the durat ion of stay), and finally to reestablish themselves either at
their original location or elsewhere.
In San Franc i sco, trans por tat ion
breakdowns interfered mostly with getting into and out of the city.
With a
population of 400,000 left homeless; 300,000 fled the city and about 70,000 of
these never returned.
7. Vulnerability.
A primary mental health problem was that of
individuals surviving the primary event being left "nervous" enough to be
traumatized by imagined precursors of repetition. The terror of reoccurrence
generates positive feedback loops that adds to subsequent losses.
Irrational
action can be triggered by minor events.

8. Crime. Fear of looting, hope of being spared at the last moment, and
efforts to save valued possessions prevented flight until the last possible
moment, and added to the congestion during movement to places of personal
safety. A common practice is to bring in the army to provide Eor the safety
of the community, announce sti ff penalties (shoot looters on sight), and
gradually return responsibility to local officials.
9. rnsurance concerns.
Some insurance companies treated their San
Francisco obligations with contempt. Three European companies denied refused
to pay and withdrew from doing business in the United States. Three others
settled after arbitrary percentage discounts to all claims.
10.- Charlatans. Some vendors took financial advantage of desperate needs
(lack of customer protection while law enforcement personnel are diverted
elsewhere). Water was sold by the glass.
rn San Francisco, draymen who had
charged $2 per day charged $75 to help people move their goods the day after
the earthquake.
11. Health. The San Francisco experience was that the general health of
the City was vastly better in the months following the fire compared to what
it had been before (Bronson 1959, p. 125). Physically,
a. Many sickly left town.
b. Fresh air and exercise for all.
c. Liquor banned.
Mentally, new opportunities were created for people of vision to make a new
city.
12. Expressions of desire to rebuild a better place. This could be as an
investment or as an advertisement for venture capital. "We want to be part of
the big boom the new San Francisco will have. We believe it will be a better
and greater city than ever.1I
"Like a powerful catalyst, the conflagration
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quickened the detail of human experience. Simple acts of kindness were framed
forever in the City's memory." new friendships. There remained " •• the organization of a great city, including the apparatus of government and business,
families, traditions, reputations, credits, and established relations with the
rest of the world."
13. Corruption.
The greed of corrupt officials and the San Francisco
City Hall grew.
Property owners paid under the counter for permits and
inspections.
Top officials were convicted and sent to prison.
"Its
housecleaning was as thorough as its physical cleaning by fire.
A new clean
government came to power" (Bronson 1959, p. 180).
V. PROCESS ANALYSIS.
The above evidence leaves no doubt that economic, environmental, and
social values are magnified at property, community, and regional scales.
The descriptive information in the appendices gave a good starting point for
examining synergistic interactions and hypothesizing magnification processes.
The process analysis sought guidelines for defining thresholds between
scales. These vary among the goals.
An environmental super catastrophe may
be only a mild economic disaster.
The threshold depends on the size of the
interact ion arena with respect to the goal.
For example, economic man
interacts in the market place, species interact in habitat units, and people
interact in social groups.
Consequently, a threshold depends on impact
magnitude relative to the relevant arena.
A. Classification.
The reasonable starting assumption is that different
types of damage vary greatly in propensity to magnification; consequently, one
must know the types of damage occurring in order to make a reasonable
magnificat ion est imate.
Orderly assessment requires a damage taxonomy that
can be used to identify locations whose seating effects are important.
One
can then systematically review damage types, explore processes, and
approximate amounts of magnification. This section presents a trial taxonomy
and then uses it to structure the following process analysis.
The taxonomy begins with the economic, environmental, and social, values
expressed in goals Gl through GIO.
Other dimensions with potentially
significant influences on impact are:

1. Property type: homes, industrial or commercial buildings,
landscaping, agriculture, public and critical facilities, and
hazardous
materials are distinguished because of differences in the made and
urgency of repair.
2.
Property ownership: public, private, or
dist inguished because of di fferences in values served
available for restoration.
3. Response approach:

corporate are
and resources
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a. Restorat ion (more common for the a ffl uen t) .
The owner who
repairs his property to a pre-catastrophe condition or replaces it
in kind judges that the value retrieved justifies the cost.
b.
Replacement (more common after larger events).
Some owners
replace damaged or destroyed property with a different design as an
altogether different use than was there before.
c. Coping (more common for the poor). Other afflicted simply do the
best they can in their circumstances because they cannot or do not
find repair worthwhile. Here the damages are the costs of coping and
other losses found in G2 through G10.
4. Indirect (technological external
(pecuniary external effects) impacts.

effects)

and

secondary

B. Analysis of Processes 1n the Economic Domain.
Gl: Economic Value.
The flood wave resulting from dam failure causes massive destruction.
Pate-Cornell and Tagaras (1986) used damage ratios estimating destruction of
90 percent of the property on the path of the wave and 10 to 15 percent in
inundated backwater areas.
Refinement of the analysis to map the severity
factors and property-scale occupancy would give more reliable results.
A catastrophic dam break above a laterally confined floodplain would
cause almost total destruction in the path of the flood wave at the property
scale.
Lesser losses would occur in tributary backwaters and after wave
dissipation downstream. At the community scale, the damage ratio would depend
on community juxtaposition within the floodplain but would be unlikely to
approach 90 percent.
Consequently, one tends to be deal ing with complete
destruction at the property scale and partial loss at the larger scales.
Where the destruct ion is complete, losses encompass the costs of
relocation to a new site, the extra cost of temporary occupancy of the less
favored location, restoration of the destroyed property, and return.
Where
the destruction is partial, the loss covers the costs of coping with the
impaired functioning and repair.
All of these costs may be increased by
aftermath interferences.
The impairment may be worsened by deterioration during the aftermath
period.
Rapid salvage can recover some lost items, rapid cleanup stops the
deterioration and thereby reduces repair cost, and rapid repair reduces lost
value from property investment.
Capac i ties for c.leanup and repa ir are
themselves impaired by the event and overloaded by the work to be done. The
overload causes the demand to exceed the supply and raises costs. Capacities
may be augmented by emergency help (but emergency help is notoriously
inefficient) and are gradually restored as firms are reestablished and the
backlog dwindles.
Income losses are important for agriculture and business, but most damage
estimates are based on the purchase of repair services or replacement items in
the market.
Economists place a normative val ue on market prices where the
transactions are too small to exert influence. However, a major catastrophe
places a sudden demand that may exceed normal market transactions over a

16
period of several years while simultaneously greatly reducing the capacity of
suppliers to respond.
Some sort of dynamic economic model would be required to predict prices
and assign normative values in this situation.
Certain production segments
may experience temporary large product ion reduct ions, and transport systems
may not be able to make up the difference through importation. Baecher, Pate,
and de Neufville (1980) suggest input-output analysis in the dam-break context
for assessing intersect oral impacts (the secondary effects of losses in one
production sector on others), but available models will not be reliable where
the disaster is large enough to alter the matrix coefficients.
Furthermore,
the analysis would have to be on a time scale much shorter and with much
greater market instability and uncertainty than assumed for most economic
models.
Specifically, disasters add demand for repair and replacement items and
reduce the ability of suppliers to provide them. The scale dimension to watch
in determining whether to expect magnification would be the capacity of the
suppliers serving the victims relative to the demand triggered by the event.
Assessment is complicated by the variety of relevant capacities.
For example, economic loss is magnified by factors inhibiting rapid
salvage of items that would otherwise become lost and rapid cleanup of
possessions that would deteriorate while buried in mud and water or otherwise
exposed to the elements.
Cleanup delays add substantially to repair cost for
damaged propert ies.
Cleanup requires access to spec ial supplies, but the
labor is generally not handled through market processes.
The labor cost can
largely be considered a loss in "real income ll and will be considered more in
that section.
The principal process observed as causing repair cost magnification was
the insufficient capacity of the regional construction industry to undertake
the desired repair.
Donations and relief measures help but are seldom
efficiently directed. The impact may be reduced by importing workers at added
cost.
Individuals pay premium prices for quicker repair, added magnification
occurs because the premium prices entice charlatans installing shoddy
materials with inexperienced labor as well as crooks extract ing payment but
doing little if any work. The cost of second "repairs" adds to the loss.
Probably the best data source for examining additional processes during
super catastrophes at the regional scale is the San Francisco earthquake and
fire.
That event generated a national relief program, vast refugee camps,
massive resettlement of the working class into nearby cities, and housing
reconstruction for over 500,000 people.
While construction, communication,
and -transportation systems have advanced greatly over the last 80 years and
the sparse numerical data cannot be used directly, the situation provides a
reasonable starting point for conjecturing how similar devastation would be
handled today.
Part of the rationale used for employing risk analysis in the economic
evaluation of large public projects is that the collective risk aversion
approaches zero for losses shared among large numbers of people (Baecher,
Pate, and de Neufville 1980). However, even thought many people are impacted
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at the property scale, few connnun1tles are involved.
One must consider risk
aversion at the community scale as contributing to damage magnification.
A rich literature has recently been developing on applying the
"cont ingent eval uat ion method" using quest ionna ires and reI ated percept ion
probing to estimate willingness to pay for items that are not directly
evaluated by market processes (Curmnings, Brooksh ire, and Schu lze 1986).
For
example, Brookshire, Eubanks, and Sorg (1986) conclude their assessment of
application of the concept to environmental evaluations by doubting its
reasonableness because expres sed envi ronmen tal go al s con fl ic t wi th the
assumptions of economic efficiency.
An even larger limitation to application
to environmental and social catastrophic impacts is that it relies on
percept ions where the popu lat ion at risk is poorly informed on the physical
consequences of a major dam failure.
One way, however, to address this
difficulty would be to develop a computerized graphical display capability
that can effectively convey dam-break flood hazard.
Process Review:
Yancey et al. (1976) examined data on repair costs
following a number of disasters and found magnification where the total
damage exceeded the annual construction volume within an Economic Area
defined by the Bureau of Economic Analysis but not in cases experiencing
lesser damages. The largest quantified magnification was fourfold 1n
Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, following Hurricane Agnes when the ratio of
normal repair cost to annual construction capacity reached 9.1.
The Yancey index gives two important dimensions for measuring capacity ln
the economic domain; a spacial dimension defined by the size of an
economic trade area and a time dimension of one year. In this ratio, the
economic trade area scales the community in wh ich people interac t 1n
buying and selling goods and services.
The year is an approximation of
the maximum acceptable repair period.
It is also the time unit used to
report personal and business incomes.
In addition, the Yancey index provides a basis for hypothesizing
thresholds for the other goals.
Specifically, one can hypothesize that
the threshold to use in going from the individual scale to the community
scale should be based the domain in which individuals interact relative
to the goal at hand. The index would then be the ratio of the impact of
to the period of time required for the disturbed domain to effect
recovery.
The magnification of econom1C loss 1S also important for financial
(insurance) planning because of the impact on budgeting (settling
claims).
The benefits to be achieved by reducing magnificat ion suggest
additional possibilities for relief programs: after a catastrophe,
victims would gain substantially from programs to sustain the delivery of
goods and services at normal prices (prevent pr ice gouging).
Programs
prov id ing free repa ir (where government must 0 ften ab sorb very large
price gouging) have become counter product ive because they do not have
price as either an allocation vehicle or as an incentive to consurmnate
delivery.
Programs for brokering repair services (providing information
on vendors and costs) and facilitating the movement of temporary repair

18
capacity into an area (whether governmental or industrial) should also be
given greater attention.
The above analysis deals with repa~rlng to restore a property to meet the
income-generating and personal needs of an owner or manager.
When one
scales upward to the community level, one enters the domain of repairing
to restore the ability of local business and government to serve public
and civil needs.
The repairs should restore facilities, replenish
stockpiles, reestablish communications among buyers and sellers, and
reinstate transport systems for goods and people.
Civil needs encompass
cultural and recreational items.
Catastrophic damages encompass the
costs of restoration and the losses suffered through market
inefficiencies during the recovery period.
Occasionally, the destruction may be so large as to necessitate the
replanning and reconstruct ion of large urban areas.
This changes the
mode from the relatively expensive repair of individual properties to
mass construction and offers the potentials of a better planned
community, more modern (disaster resistant) design, and urban renewal.
However, dambreaks are too rare for flood proofing investment against
reoccurrences to have much economic value.
Property Type.
Magni fication can be expected to vary great ly among
property types because they differ in the activities involved in repair
or replacement and the activities vary in the market factors influencing
cost escalation.
The analysis by Yancey et al. (1976) concentrated on
buildings.
Building repair magnification is probably greatest for
residences and small commercial buildings where the owners have least
experience in procuring least-cost help repair markets.
The repair of
larger buildings requires specialized equipment (probably drawing from a
larger economic area) handled by owners with special resources.
Agricultural and landscaping damages are probably less subject to magnification as owners either suffer losses or delay repairs. Infrastructure
repair cost escalation is tied to the in-house repair capacity of the
concerned utilities and mounts when local entities must contract with
external sources.
The costs of emergency repair of critical facilities
or protect ing the pub I ic against hazardous materials are part icularl y
magnification -prone because quick action is required in a framework
where cost is no object.
Responding Institution. Individuals, public entItles, and companies vary
greatly in their repair resources.
Individuals are probably the most
dependent on local markets, and large corporations are the
most likely
to draw resources from other locations.
Public entlt~es can usually
obtain help from state and federal governments when events reach catastrophic proport ions (but may feel pressured by the long time lags
involved). The socially disadvantaged may be poorly informed as to help
alternatives and needlessly do the work on their own.
Response Mode.
Greater pressure for quick return magnifies the economic
losses because repair is forced before the market can develop new
channels to supply necessary goods and services.
The replacement mode
works to reduce costs because of the economics of mass construction and
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the advantages of more efficient design.
Cases where victims cope with
the losses have little economic magnification, but their social
magnification may be quite large because of the burden placed on the poor
and socially disadvantaged.
Indirect Impacts.
Dealing with the losses caused by catastrophe detract
from productive activities.
The users of output from the local economy
experience losses, delays, and higher prices.
The largest indirect
impacts are probably associated with firms withdrawing from business and
local governments discontinuing services. After Agnes, one Pennsylvania
community advertised to attract replacement businesses.
Followup.
The magnificat ion and higher-sc ale processes out lined above
are important enough to deserve research attention.
Some topics that
should be particularly pursued are:
a.
More precise estimation of construction capacity by activity
type.
b.
Inventory and analysis of impacts at the community scale
requiring restoration.
c.
Analysis of urban renewal experiences as a guide toward
efficient community restoration.
Analysis of Processes in the Environmental Domain.
G2: Ecological Value.
One may question the existence of ecological damage on the grounds that
floods, as fires, are recognized by ecologists as having a Ifcleansingll value.
Dambreak floods, however, occur at sizes, times, and places that nature cannot
produce.
Ecological loss has been indexed (James et a1. 1978) by the time
period required for natural recovery to pre-event posltlons.
One would
definitely expect scaling magnification of the recovery period as destruction
areas increase from scattered plants and animals (replaced rapidly), to
habitats' (taking years to restore), to species (beyond restoration).
For
threshold scaling, the spacial dimension would be relative to the geographical
area occupied by a habitat, and the time dimension would relate to the
duration of flooding required for a given habitat to be destroyed. One would
only expert large ecologic magnification in ecologic areas positioned to be
entirely disturbed by the flood.
Process Review.
The above construct of economic loss can be integrated
with general environmental information as a starting point for assessing
the effect of catastrophe on loss in environmental value. A disaster may
cause massive ecological disturbance. Aftermath and recovery processes
are largely biological.
Analogy with the economic domain leads one to
hypothesize that environmental magnification occurs when local
environments are disturbed to a point where important spec ies mus t
migrate back from a distance.
This conceptualization requires
measurement of the extent of a habitat in terms of the area of easy
species movement and interaction.
Environments, like market areas tend to organize in "seLf-contained"
units. Swamp, riverine, and alpine environments are examples. When the
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ecological disturbance is surrounded by its parent "uni t, II recovery
should be relatively rapid (albeit variable with the type of unit and the
extent of the disturbance just as economic repair costs).
When the
disturbance alters the entire unit beyond its ready restoration capacity,
higher scale processes come to the fore.
Annual cycles probably pertain to species as well as economies
be.;ause of the periodic ity of the seasons.
The ecological momentum 0 f
destructive processes through an aftermath period deserves further study.
Recovery could be speeded by enhancing known contributors on the critical
path toward ecological recovery.
Species Type.
Recovery time varies over the impacted species and the
interdependenc s among them.
The greatest magnification would occur
with rare or endangered spec ies, because they both draw from a smaller
replenishing resource and the factors causing their numbers to diminish
also slow recovery.
Responding Institutions.
Natural environments recover through natural
processes, but these can be enhanced or delayed by human intervention.
The modern world also contains many imported species in "gardens" that
must be carefully maintained to survive. A catastrophe would interrupt
maintenance of these entities.
Response Mode.
Natural biological processes doubt lessly vary in their
res i lience after disrupt ion.
They could be analyzed for important
differences should a case arise where the issue deserves the research
effort.
Indirect Impacts.
The catastrophe diverts human effort from
environmental maintenance, and reconstruct ion activity may cause
environmental harm during the reconstruction period.
Species not
directly impacted by the flood could be affected indirectly through their
food chains.
Followup.
While these relationships contain inter.esting aspects, losses
in ecological and other environmental values were given less attention in
this study because of the a prior judgment of lesser importance as dambreak consequences.
Ecological impacts are probably small except in
local situations with specific problems.
Any future studies should
identify and concentrate on these.

G3:

Aesthetic Value.
A catastrophe inflicts tremendous aesthetic loss.
Reconstruction
activity could add to aesthetic disturbance during the aftermath period.
Aesthet ic recovery would occur as reconstruct ion is completed and vegetat ion
returns.
Process Review.
Magnification would be associated with slower recovery
when the devastation is more widespread.
It would be reduced to the
degree that collective personal preference begins to accept the changes
in appearance. One would expect the scal ing dimension to be related to
the area that can be seen by eye from vista points.
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Attraction Type.
Attractions can be ranked aesthetically with the most
attractive being the most vulnerable to damage and the least attractive
being cases where removal would be an aesthetic gain.
Responding Institutions.
Property owners who are particularly slow to
repair damages property or landscaping may leave aesthetically
displeasing reminders of past disasters.
Response Mode. Both human restoration and natural processes work to the
aesthetics of damaged areas.
Indirect Impacts.
Aesthetic disturbances may became a sign of urban
blight or, worse yet, generate adverse reaction psychologically in people
who associate them with unpleasant memories.
Followup.
The effects identified above seem too small, compared with
other losses, to devote much attention to estimating scale effects on the
aesthetic damages from dam-break catastrophes.
However, the psychological impacts of aesthetic deterioration is one topic that may deserve
some study.
G4: Historic Value.
Individual sites of great historic, cultural, or religious value could be
ruined by a major flood.
One would not expect nonlinearity in summing losses
over multiple sites.
Magnification, however, may be more important when
considering the impacts of losses of non-replaceable historic, cultural, or
religious attributes of sites on the well-being of the community.
Process Review.
Catastrophic conditions could have an important impact
in preventing recovery and cleanup of salvageable items after a disaster.
One reason why historic loss magnification is probably not important is
that a restoration can reestablish general public satisfaction as was
found in Europe after World War II.
Site Type.
Historic value is concentrated in a few properties which
become honored by antiquity or associations with particular events. The
potential for loss magnification is probably tied to the relative
importance of artifacts and the inter.ference that catastrophe would pose
for their recovery.
Responding Institutions.
Sites of particular historical value are
generally either owned by a public agency or historic foundation.
A
catastrophe is likely to pose many other restoration costs to these
entities.
A greater popular urgency for many of them may delay
restoration activity for the historic sites and add to their loss.
An
offsetting factor may be that major losses may have sufficient national
interest to be covered through financial appeals.
Response Mode.
Restoration to original conditions requires specially
trained labor, and obtaining it may cause signi ficant delays. However,
the more relaxed time frame should further reduce any magnification
effect.
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Indirect Impacts.
Major historic sites have particular attraction to
some individuals who in turn feel a major loss. The long term loss to
future generations of lost contact with their heritage may be
particularly important. In another dimension, tourism could be adversely
affected.
Followup.
Nevertheless, as an initial judgment call, this goal is
probably of lesser importance for this study.
The magnification of
historic damages does not deserve further study other than for the
possible goal of ident ifying and watching part icularl y noteworthy site s
in hazard areas.
GS: Scientific Value.
Scientific loss would be caused by the destruction of data
experimentation, and information of scientific value.

sources,

Process Review.
Neither scientific loss nor its magnification was
mentioned in the popular descriptions of any of the cases reviewed. In
some cases, a catastrophe could destroy major stashes of information of
lasting scientific value, but losses to study areas or scientific
equipment are seldom significant.
On the other side, observations of
catastrophe have important values, both scientifically and through their
contribution to reducing future losses.
Site Type. Scientific value is concentrated in a few storehouses of rare
information.
Each is unique, and unique sites have less magnification
potential. One would, however, store such items out of risk areas.
Responding Institutions. Scientific work is largely performed by corporations, governmental research units, and universities.
All these
institutions could suffer financial and personnel impacts that slow
cleanup and restoration.
Response Mode. The normal immediate response mode would be to reorganize
scattered informat ion and restore experimental areas to the degree
possible. Society may lose by being deprived of valuable knowledge, but
this impact is generally small.
Indirect Impacts.
Any loss or delay ~n application of important
scientific information has ripple effects on potential users throughout
society. Corporations could potentially suffer a major blow in product
development.
These impacts would be important were there evidence of
significant losses.
Followup.
Since scientific activity involves worldwide interaction,
disruptions must be at a very large scale, and scientific damages were
judged not to merit immediate further study.
G6: Pristine value.
A dambreak would scar a pristine environment; however, pristine
environments are already altered by flow regulation below dams. Consequently,
one would scarcely expect this goal to be important here.
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Process Review.
Officially-declared wilderness areas are unlikely below
major dams.
Individual s may consider certain smaller areas as pristine
and derive the enjoyment value from
them that others attach to
wilderness. The loss of a pristine are would not be recoverable and thus
not subject to magnification.
Site Type.
Pristine areas vary considerably, and their differences
should be considered in assessing the loss caused by catastrophe.
Responding Institutions.
Responsible organizations may become involved
in protecting pristine areas from further deterioration or attempt to
restore impacted areas.
These efforts could also be impaired by events
reaching catastrophic scale.
The response combines protection from further
Response Mode.
deteriorat ion and bearing the loss. The long time lags and the unique
attributes counter any magnification.
Indirect Impacts. The primary loss lies in the meditative and recreative
values of pristine areas.
Followp.
Several potential impacts are noted above, but further study
is not judged warranted for any of them. .
D. Analysis of Processes in the Social Domain.
G7: Real Incomes.
Disasters impact people in many ways not covered in monetary value, and
the magnitude of these losses led this study to devote considerable effort to
identify and classify losses that people feel keenly.
Secondly, people vary
considerably in ability to cope with catastrophe.
The literature records
correla~ions with income and sex.
The poor place greater reliance on social
resources in coping whereas the wealthy depend more on economic resources.
The poor worry more about job losses, and the rich more about business losses.
Where the social resources are important, the seal ing would be expected to
depend on the size of the impacted area relative to the area occupied by the
reinforcing social community.
Process Review.
The case studies showed a wide variety of losses in
real, as opposed to monetary, income.
These were classified among
disturbance of social reinforcing, interruption of personal time,
unpleasant personal experiences, loss of community services, and loss of
personal property.
Losses in these six classifications involves
distinctive processes as outlined below.
Social reinforcement contributes to human mental well-being by the
support and presence of family, friends, and other kindred spirits giving
help and fellowship.
A large event separates people from these social
resources.
The aftermath period is one of growing fear and perhaps
substantive information that key relationships will never be restored.
Recovery occurs with the restoration of original relationships or tl}e
establishment of substitutionary ones. Social reinforcing takes place 1n
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several dimensions (family, neighborhood, and organ izat ional memberships)
and at several levels (local and regional).
Quantification is very
difficult, but the impacts of losing social reinforcement are believed
subject to intense magnification because the important r.elationships can
be confined to a small region that can suffer very severe impact (e.g.
Buffalo Creek).
Consequently, a smaller event can reach catastrophe
classification.
Time interrupti.ons provide a second major component of personal
loss. Countless hours are spent in flight, making temporary arrangements
for work and living, cleaning and restoring damaged property, and
countless other unfamiliar and disturbing activities.
The burden is
particularly felt by busy people, even when people can be hired to do the
manual work.
This loss is also subject to major magnificat ion because
larger events scales spread people over larger areas and greatly
compl icate the arrangements.
Frustrat ions add aggravat ion and can harm
health in severe cases.
Recovery occurs with the restoration of
comfortable activity patterns.
Third, the many unpleasant experiences people suffer during a
disaster event have many short and long term sequences that cannot be
assigned a monetary value.
These can have either phys ical or mental
causes.
The former can stem from exhausting over-activity and exposure
to dampness and cold during the event and the physical discomforts of
living in makeshift facilities afterwards.
The mental anguish grows out
of the shock of seeing possessions lost, homes destroyed, and the injury
or death of friends and family.
During the aftermath period, people
relive their experiences over and over. Opportunities for conversations
may gradually build therapeut ic effects.
These losses are also subject
to severe magnification because physical and mental experiences largely
relate to the area within walking distance of one's home. People who are
temporarily visiting the impact area or have just moved into it probably
feel less mental anguish.
The fourth identified loss in real income occurs as people lose the
accustomed continuous ready availability of electricity, phones, streets,
water and sewer, libraries, etc.
They suffer when these are not
available.
Again magnification begins at a small scale, but probably
larger than a local neighborhood. People do not mind nearly so much when
their phone is out and they can walk across the street and use a
neighbors as they do when all the phones are out.
Aftermath effects
occur as a consequence of people going to extra expense or suffering
losses during the period of di sconnected services.
Recovery generally
comes quickly after services are restored. Magnification comes as larger
. events extend the period of service interruption.
Fifth and finally, personal losses are important because many people
view the loss of personal treasures and records that have little value to
others as the largest damage that they suffer. Possessions are generally
of unique value to specific individuals. Consequently, their loss is
probably not subject to S1 gni ficant magnification beyond their add i tive
value.
However larger scale events can separate individuals from their
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possessions for larger periods and cause added loss by reducing recovery
percentages.
Social Group. A second component of the analysis required to est imate
losses in real income is to examine the distribution of these five
classes of losses among social groups.
The magnifications will depend
on how the various losses are distributed among people with different
coping capabilities and how the event and its aftermath have underlined
the capability.
Groupings are by income, sex, ethnic group, and social
contacts.
The literature, both experimental and scientific, show most
of the five classes of loses listed above to vary with social grouping,
closely knit local communit ies are part icularl y sens i t ive to socia 1
disruption.
People with a wider variety of contacts are in a stronger
position.
The loss of time seems most important to the particularly busy. In
contrast, the poorer and less educated feel greater discomfort or even
trauma at having to deal with unfamiliar situations without many of the
coping mechanisms available to the more affluent. Consequently, the disadvantaged are more intimidated by the repair process.
On the other
hand, the middle and upper classes probably feel the loss of services and
personal property more intensely; but they are better able to recover by
going elsewhere or finding substitutes.
Respond ing Inst itut ions. Governmental, char itab Ie, re 1 igious, and
fraternal organizations provide a great deal of support to help people
during the aftermath and with the recovery from catastrophes.
Communities face intense pressure from the catastrophe-induced demand for
emergency services and temporary support functions. Simultaneously they
face large expenditures in restoring basic services at a time when their
own losses may have crippled their effectiveness.
The nongovernmental
institutions vary greatly in effectiveness.
They work best in helping
people with whom they were more closely identified before the event and
generally suffer from acting more in response to outside perceptions than
real local needs. Many of these activities are delayed by larger scale
events to augment losses.
Response Mode. People establish new contacts for social reinforcement
needs. They have few ways to salvage lost time and continue to feel the
pressures for an extended period.
Unpleasantness and personal losses
probably harm morale and reduce the will to recover. Community services
are repaired as quickly as possible with the cost being aggravated by the
demands for additional help.
Indirect Impacts. The burdens that people feel personally detract from
their ability to function.
At the community scale, the event reduces
institutional ability for effective performance and compounds the
problems as disturbed people become a larger percentage of a community's
population.
The effects at both scales impact many people that were not
harmed directly.
Followup. Of the ten goals, real income losses probably have the largest
magn1.f1.cation
and the amount would be particularly large where the
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geographical area occupied by the community is small and concentrated in
the floodplain.
Real income impacts are the least studied but probably
account for the most severe flood damage magnification. A great deal of
attention should be given to studies to understand these processes and
their impacts better. Specific priority research topics include:
a.
Longitudinal recording and assessment of the five identified
impact processes.
b.
Clinical examination of the capabilities of various social
groups to coping with losses.
c.
Longitudinal study of community-scale performance i providing
goods and services. both those commonly del ivered by the pub 1 ic
sector and the food and shelter more commonly purchased in the
market place.
d. Hypothetical assessment of how these performance indicators may
operate at the regional scale.
e.
Studies to develop reI ief programs that more effectively meet
basic identified needs.
f.
Development of programs providing psychological treatment for
risk groups who are less able to cope.
G8: Health.
Loss of life and health is the most publicized impact of catastrophe and
another one expected to. have a major scale effect.
A community can absorb a
few deaths more easily than the loss of large segments of its population. The
loss of life may be increased when the number injuries exceed the treatment
capacity of local health services.
Living through a catastrophe impacts
mental health.
The flood wave resulting from dam failure can take large numbers of
lives. Pate-Cornell and Tagaras (1986) used a casualty ratio estimating the
loss of 50 percent of the population in the path of a flood wave such as the
which occurred below the sudden failure of Malpasset Dam in France in 1959
when no warning was possible.
Process Review.
The headlines generated by natural catastrophes
emphasize loss of life and numbers of people injured.
Floods have an
added health impact because they occur in inclement weather. expose
people to the cold and wet. and cause many to become ill. Protection of
life and health is the primary objective of emergency teams during major
events.
The catastrophic events leaves many dead, injured. or trapped at
locations requiring rescue.
During the aftermath period. lingering
threats to heath are found in contaminated water supplies and toxic
materials carried into living areas by the floodwater.
Some noted
problems included raw sewage, hazardous chemicals. and insects.
Local health officials should continue their emergency activities until
these situations have been rectified. However, this sustained capacity
to operate on an emergency basis may be lacking, particularly when many
of the required activities are outside the comfort area of the employees.
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The added pressures and
problems of this group.

consequent

exhaustion may add

to

the health

However, records a Iso show a strong counter force that br i ngs out the
best in people.
The challenge and the sense of helping through the
results achieved by extra effort is a positive morale builder and has
strong beneficial efforts.
The principle used in assessing damage cost magnification also seems to
apply to health losses; however, the size of the health-care region and
the time scale used to index capac ity are both smaller than the market
areas used in damage analysis. Hospital service areas are much smaller
than the BEA regions, and the time period for ini t ial treatment is no
more than a few days.
Both compressions would add to magnification.
Fortunately, severe tests of community health care capacity are rare, but
a more thorough search of the literature may uncover useful information.
The pub l i shed report s on disaster-impacted areas suggest consequent
mental illness to be as widespread and as severe as physical problems.
Obv ious ly, catastrophe experiences generate cons iderab le trauma among
survivors. Memories may bring intense guilt at not having saved someone
or something or otherwise acted more rationally during the emergency.
This hypothesis is reinforced by records of damages magnified by
irrational actions.
Fear lingers in the hearts of people who have experienced the trauma (and
aftermath) of a major disaster.
The ability of a community to act
effectively is reduced by irrational fears. Lesser fears can be expected
among people living downstream from other dams. Any exodus would trigger
economic deter iorat ion.
These effect s have been noted at the community
and regional scales after major wars. At the national scale, such fears
would hamper the entire water resources program.
Social
The primary criterion for dividing people among social
groups
respect to analyzing health impacts is differences in
susceptibility to death or physical or mental illness.
Certainly, age
and general health prior to the event are important.
Income and other
social attributes may affect propensity to secure professional attention
and proper medication.
Responding Institutions.
Public, private and philanthropic rescue
activities are widespread after a major disaster. Their primary goal is
to reduce the loss of life and quickly provide people with medical
attention to minimize adverse effects on their heal th.
Rescue is also
capacity limited, but the capacity can be significantly increased through
emergency preparedness efforts. As a disaster moves into the communityscale, increasing interference and inefficiencies in this mobilization
adds to the losses. These aspects of catastrophe deserve more attention.
Health care also encompasses treating people during and immediately after
the event and continuing services, particularly in the mental health
area, for sometime afterwards.
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Response Mode.
People unable to obtain health care when needed may
suffer lingering or even permanent effects.
Indirect Impacts.
People whose health suffers are a productivity minus
that lasts for a long time both as it affects individuals made less
productive. Also the burden on health care facilities renders people in
the community with ailments unrelated to the disaster receive worse
serv1.ce.
Followup.
The impacts of catastrophe on mental health are particulary
deserving of further attention.
Other studies are needed to pursue
health care capacity, the impacts of its limitations, and how it can be
most effectively augmented on an emergency basis.
G9: Educational Opportunities.
Educational and recreational opportunities would certainly be interrupted
by a catastrophe, but no descriptions of the historical events showed the
impacts to be either a major or subject to significant magnification.
Process Review.
Provisions can be made for both activities on a
temporary basis after a catastrophe.
At the regional scale, a super
catastrophe may begin to cause significant educational impacts.
Social Group. Less mobile
strongly.

social

groups

would

feel

these

losses more

Responding Institutions.
A burden would be placed on the community to
restore these facilities, but the time frame would not be so demanding as
to cause a major cost escalation problem. Public schools, governmental
recreation facilities, private schools, and privately-owned entertainment
centers would all be impacted to varying degrees.
Response Mode. The community normally acts to restore basic educational
facilities quickly. People can improvise with respect to recreation, and
this has not been noted to cause a problem.
Indirect Impacts. Minor.
Followup.
After a dam break flood, schools would be closed, and
recreational activities would be altered. However, quick recovery would
generally occur.
The losses are not anticipated as a major factor in
magnification. Little reason was uncovered to give priority to studying
this aspect further •
. GIO: Emergency Preparedness.
For this study, the catastrophe is the emergency requlrlng preparedness
and police protection.
One could examine the impact of one disaster on the
ability of the community to cope with additional ones (simultaneous
earthquakes, wars, etc.); however, these joint probabilities are low.
A
catastrophe necessitates the immediate police problems of protecting property
from looting and maintaining order among crowds who may become desperate for
food and shelter.
Emergency preparedness also covers evacuation, temporary
shelter, and orderly return.
One suspects that these needs are not met
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efficiently during catastrophes and that these needs multiply as one goes to
larger events.
Process Review. Prompt emergency action by local officials to deal with
catastrophe can substantially reduce losses of life, economic damage, and
adverse social impacts.
People expect direct help during the event as
we 11 as protection of their personal safety and property during the
aftermath period when they lose control over their personal "territory."
However, looting (whether by hungry people looking for food or criminals
stealing for profit) has generally not been as common as people feared.
The capacity of a community to provide emergency comes first.
Warning
and evacuation systems may become nonfunctional during major
catastrophes. Over a longer period, shelter, services, and jobs must be
found or people will move away to find the necessities of life.
Forced
moves are traumatic situations and become more so for a socially selfcontained community or should the relocation become permanent.
Dams are overtopped by major hydrologic events.
A meteorological event
large enough to overtop a dam will probably cause prior widespread
flooding below. Evacuation routes may be flooded before they are needed.
Depth-area-duration curves can be used to examine the extent of such
storms and plan emergency actions in the context of likely interference
from simultaneous events.
Quickly assembled emergency help is notoriously inefficient. They don't
know what to do and may alienate the local population by their ineptness
and attitude.
A larger problem Lies in the fact that catastrophes are
too rare for really experienced people to be active. A larger event adds
to the number of people to be directed, and the added congestion becomes
a considerable magnification factor.
Social Group.
All soc ial groups become more or less equal dud ng the
period of flight before pending catastrophe.
The primary differences
would be in recovery time where groups with more money or better contacts
come out ahead.
Responding Institutions. A catastrophe places a sudden large burden on a
wide variety of local governments and corporate and organizational
entities.
Many individuals prefer to go it alone and resent outside
interference.
Where an agency's response capacity is exceeded, it will
have trouble acting effectively and could add to rather than reduce the
losses.
Response Mode. The normal response is to quickly mobilize a program of
rescue, supervised flight, temporary food and shelter, and repair
assistance.
One suspects that the capacity of the typical system is
small, and that magnification of losses caused by performance
inefficiencies begins with a fairly small event.
Indirect Impacts.

Many people are harmed by the mass of fleeing refuges.
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Followup.
Study is needed for improving the effectiveness of emergency
response. Most communities below major dams have a general program. They
are unlikely to be specific enough to function well during a moderately
sized disaster; and one can particularly doubt their effectiveness during
a really large event. Many of the above descriptions give good advice on
improving them.

VI. FIRST APPROXIMATIONS OF MAGNIFICATION MAGNITUDE
A. Principal Processes.
Based on the above analysis, nine principal
process arenas were selected as generating damage magnificat ion (Table 1).
The amount of loss growing out of that damage is determined as people choice
between an active response to restore prior conditions and or passive
acceptance and suffering losses over time.
Certain choice determinants are
hypothesized on Table 1 as determining whether a person responds actively or
passively.
The introduction of connnunity-scale impacts depends on the size
and juxtaposi t ion of the disaster event and a measure of impac t within that
cormnunity.
Judgments on these factors with respect to the 9 identified
processes are listed on Table 1.
The processes in all nine arenas operate in
event, aftermath, and recovery time frames.
The interactions within and among these arenas may be represented by
positively and negatively reinforcing feedback loops.
Sorting out and
quant i fying these processes and simulat ing the ir collec t i ve impacts would
require a research effort far beyond the scope of this study.
B. Magnification by a "Worst-Case" Scenario.
If one orders the degrees of
catastrophe in terms of deaths, Ayaswamy et al. (1974) estimate that 200,000
fatalities could result from a dam break failure is in the order of 1000 times
the number caused by Hurricane Agnes (less than 200) or any other natural
disaster ever experienced in the Uni ted States.
Pate-Corne 11 and Tagaras
(l986) reports the Auburn Folsom-South Central Valley Project review as
stating that the collapse of a full Auburn Dam would· imperil the 1 ives of
750,000 persons in Sacramento.
Such an event would far surpass all the
catastrophes reported in the historical data and introduce interactions at the
larger regional scales.
The scale effect of moving from personal interactions to community market
and social interactions (given the above assessment that the environmental
interactions are of relatively lesser importance) would be followed by
movement into far reaching impacts on the economy, institutions, and politics.
We can, at this point, only speculate on the impacts of an "Agnes Scale"
catastrophe and then a "Super Dam Failure Catastrophe." Nine principal
magnification processes are outlined on Table 1. The active sub-processes
under each heading during impact, aftermath, and recovery, are outlined in
Table 2. Hypothetical consequences of expansions to larger scales are listed
~n Tab le 3.
McCann et al. (1985) provide an approximate method for mapping the
severity of flooding that would be caused by a dam break flood and estimating
economic loss and the loss of life. While the scope of this project did not

Table 1.

Hypothesized characterization of principal processes contributing to damage magnification.

Process

Active Response

Passive
Response

Choice
Determinant

Commun ity Un i t

Impact
Measure

1.

Disruption of
repair and
replacement
capabi lity

Repair cost
escalated

Prolonged
coping

Income. time
advers ion

Economic
trade area

Annual construction
capacity

2.

Disruption of
support from
social group

Cost of community
reestab lishment

Prolonged
coping

Cohesiveness.
leadership

Gross residential
area for soc ial
group

Percentage
moved outside
gross area

3.

Disruption of
personal time

Hiring special
help

Prolonged
coping

I

nc orne. a b i lit y •
free time

Local serVlce
area

Monthly service capacity

4.

Exposure to
disturbing
experiences

Flight. isolation

Shock
recovery

Mobility

Residential
territory

Percentage
afflicted

5.

Disruption of
basic community
infrastructure

Cost escalated
reprovision.
emergency and
long term

Community
coping

Utility serVIce
area

Annual repair
capacity

6.

Loss of personal
property

Salvage substitution or replicat ion

Pining

Residential
terri tory

Completeness
of destruct ion

Revenues
. adversion

Imagination and
resilience

W
I-'

Table 1.

Continued.

Process
7.

8.

9.

Disruption of
health care
services

Act i ve Response

Passive
Response

Cost escalated
reprovision,
emergency and
long term

Transport
elsewhere.
communi.ty
coping

Deterioration of
Professional
treatment
mental health
Inefficiencies
in emergency
services

Planned program
impr.ovement

Choice
Determ inan t
Revenues

Prolonged
Income
coping
Fam il y support
Delayed
help

Revenues
Exper t i se

Community Uni t

Impact
Measure

Hospital service
area

Da ily treatment capacity

Gross residential
Monthly treatarea for social
ment capacity
group
Political entity

Da ily service
capac i ty

W
N

Table 2.

Hypothesized time frame expansions for principal magnification processes.

Process

Impa~t

Aftermath

Recovery

1.

Disruption of
repair and
replacement
capability

Equipment destruction
Labor disruption
Transport interruption

Deterioration during
restoration delays
Enticement of poorly
qual i fied

Equipment replacement
Labor reorganization
Transport restoration
Capacity importation

2.

Disruption of
support from
social group

Death and illness
Group scatter

Lingering illnesses
Mental disorientation

Group restoration
Establishment of a new
group

3.

Disruption of
personal time

Activity diversion

Managemen t time

Problem solution

4.

Exposure to
disturbing
experiences

Scenes witnessed
Separat ion from
loved ones

Poor decisions
Absence from work

Health restoration

S.

Disruption of
basic community
infrastructure

Disrupted services

Extra cost and worse
service from temporary
fac ili ties

Restoration of normal
service

6.

Loss of personal
property

Destruction or loss
of personal effects

Additional loss or deterioration pending reestablishment

Psychological substitution, Physical
repl ication

7.

Disruption of
health care
services

Harm to facilities
Injuries requiring
treatment

Extra cost and worse service
from temporary facilities
Treatment for lingering cases

Facility restoration
Return to normal
community health

8.

Deterioration of
mental health

Fears growing out
of scenes and
separations

Continuing mental illness
Reinforcement by more bad
experiences

Return to normal
mental health

9.

Inefficiencies
in emergency
services

Disturbed preparations
Interfering inclement
weather

Inefficiencies in community
shelter and restoration
services throughout disrupt ion period

Restoration of normal
services

VJ

w

Table 3.

Hypothesized scale expansions for principal magnification processes.

Process

Personal Scale

Commun ity Scale

Regional Scale

1.

Disruption of
repair and
replacement
capability

Building and grounds
damage

Disruption of local
economy

Disruption of regional
economy

2.

Disruption of
support from
social group

Isolation from social
group, personal injury

Scatter of social
group

Disruption of social
organization at the
scale

3.

Disruption of
personal time

Mandatory personal time
commitments

Mandatory activities
for community employees

Management of regional
recovery programs

4.

Exposure to
disturbing
experiences

Personal encounters

Community failures to
supply basic needs

Regional failures to
support communities

5.

Disruption of
basic community
infrastructure

Loss of community
serVlces

Loss of utility
facilities

Breakdown of regional
communication and transportation

6.

Loss of personal
property

Heirloom loss

Disruption of substitution opportunity

Large groups losing
cultural ties

7.

Disruption of
health care
services

Loss of health
services

Loss of health
facilities

Loss of regional health
care capacity

8.

Deterioration of
ment al hea lth

Mental disturbance

Loss of work efficiency

Loss of regional spirit and
character

9.

Inefficienc ies
in emergency
serVlces

Missing or inefficient
help

Disruption by refugees

Massive resettlement
patterns

w

.po

35
permit quantitative estimation, their approach would provide an
starting point for applying the magnification factors to follow.

excellent

A dambreak flood with about the same direct impact that Hurricane Agnes
had on the Wilkes-Barre region of Pennsylvania, would cause a community-scale
magnification of "Increased Cost of Repair or Replacement" of about 4.0. The
amount could be substantially larger in other areas of the country or for
different configurations or timing of the impact ing event. The magn i Hcat ion
with respect to the other eight factors would depend on the disaster size and
its relative impact on the unit.
The nine processes contributing to damage
magnification as outlined in Table 1, the sub-processes continuing through the
aftermath and recovery periods as outlined in Table 2, and the expansions into
larger scales suggested in Table 3 provide a gross basis for approximat ing
. orders of magnitude for potential magnification.
The magnifications to be expected from a catastrophe with respect to the
nine factors would depend on the dynamic interactions during the aftermath and
the capacity of the community to commence recovery.
Quantification could be
in terms of a threshold where magni ficat ion begins and the amount of
magnification per unit increase in event size.
New thresholds and
magnification coefficients would be introduced by a super catastrophe. Since
magnification is defined as a multiple of the normal loss, the coefficient
would be larger for cases where the "normal loss base" is smaller.
These
considerat ions were used to make the approximations of the magn i fic at ion
potential for the "worst-case scenario," a super catastrophe taking
approximately 200,000 lives, shown in Table 4.
The following considerations were used in making the assessments shown in
Table 4:
1.
Agnes provided the starting point for judgments on the
magnification factors placed on this table.
A magnification of economic
loss slightly larger than that experienced by Agnes is used because of the
larger magnitude of the "Worst Case Scenario ," The large capacity of the
United States economy would place an upper bound to scaling with respect
to economic impact.
2. The Pennsylvania social communities impacted by Agnes extended up
the hill sides out of the flood plain and thus were not disrupted to the
extent found at Buffalo Creek. A dambreak flood that would cause 200,000
deaths would be much more disruptive of social communit ies than any
disaster that our country has thus far experienced.
As a factor
mitigating social disruption, the social groups in which Americans
interact are becoming so widely dispersed that it would be increasingly
difficult for an event to engulf them.
3. The magnification associated with the disruption of personal time
is expected to exceed the escalation of repair costs because individuals
generally obtain services over a local area that is much smaller than the
total economic trade area.
Also, people are quite sensitive to being
suckered by charlatans.
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Table 4.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

First Approximation Magnification Coefficients.

Disruption of repair
and replacement capability.
Disruption of support
from social group
Disruption of
personal time
Exposure to
disturbing experiences

6

20
8

50

Disruption of basic
community infrastructure

2

Loss of personal
property

6

Disruption of health
care services

3

Deterioration of
mental health

30

Inefficiencies 1n
emergency services

10
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4.
Soc iety seems to be los ing many family and small-group support
mechanisms and consequently seems to be increasingly vulnerable to severe
psychological disturbances. Mental disorders seem to be on the increase.
A super catastrophe would expose people, communities, and regions to
experiences more disturbing than any that the United States has suffered
since the Civil War.
One would consequently expect large magnification
here.
5. The modern city dweller is dependent on services provided through
community infrastructure. On the other side, utilities generally have the
resources to recover quickly, people are mobile, and the disturbances
resulting from disruptions that people accept as reasonable do not seem
large.
The replacement of aging, inefficient, or obsolete may be
attractive. Magnification is also expected to be smaller here because the
infrastructure repair cost s themselves are so large.
Magnificat ion is
also expected to be smaller here because the infrastructure repair costs
themselves are so Large.
6.
The magnitude of the sense of loss that people feel from lost
heirlooms is unknown. Estimates made from Kentucky data on the ratio of
the personal value to the economic value of real property suggest a
maximum factor of 2.25 (James 1968). The primary contributors to personal
value were the length of time the property had been in the family, where
the family would be required to move elsewhere, and the difficulty in
purchasing acceptable substitute property.
Except in cases where losses
of personal property remove a sense of security that undermines mental
health, one would expect this magnification to be about the same as it is
for economic loss.
7. Heal th services In the United States have been able to respond
effectively and rapidly to major disasters.
The magnification in this
area may largely be caused by large expenses incurred when rescue and care
are operated in an emergency mode.
8. Mental health problems could magnify immensely with larger scale
events. On the other side, people rise to the challenge of recovery; and
mental health may actually be improved among the more active.
This
consideration was the basis for holding this multiplier smaller than that
used for Process 4.
9. Our emergency services are geared to disasters much smaller than
the "worst case scenario." One would expect gross inefficiencies and some
counter productive activities with the larger events.
VII. LOCATION ANALYSIS
The analysis to determine the magnification caused by the failure of a
specific dam could employ the following steps:
1. Employ one of the available models for routing flood waves
downstream following a major dam break.
The results should be expressed
on a flood-severity map showing the maximum depths and velocities of
flooding over the extent of the inundated area.
Federal agencies have
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mapped the areas subject to inundation below a number of major dams for
purposes of evacuation planning.
The land use depiction
2. Map current land use over this area.
should encompass natural and anthropocentric propert ies relevant to
measuring losses with respect to all of the nine principal processes
outlined in Table 1.
3. For each of the nine principal processes:
a. Estimate the property-scale damage to be expected by integrating
land use with flood severity based on these two maps. Pate-Cornell
and Tagaras (1986) provide ratios for estimating damages and
casualties.
b. Make a judgment as to whether this loss is sufficient to cause
community-scale magnification by comparing the property-scale damage
with the "impact measure" in Tab le 1.
c. For processes where community-scale impact seems probab le, use
information from the literature to make the expansions indicated in
Tables 2 and 3.
The numbers on Table 4 provide a general order of
magnitude to use as a start.
This assessment should consider both
the magnification of property-scale processes and the introduction of
new processes at the community scale.
4. For each of the nine principal processes:
a. Make a judgment as to whether the community-scale losses are
sufficient to cause regional-scale magnification.
b. Use the above principles to estimate a general order of magnitude.
This assessment should consider further magnification of propertyscale processes, magnification of community-scale processes, and the
introduction of new processes at the community scale.

VIII. RESEARCH SUGGESTIONS
A. Topics. A number of research suggest ions are provided in present ing
followup ideas for more careful delineat ion of damages within the ten goal
domains. Other thoughts on topics that should be studied further include:

1. Descriptions of the impact processes that occur during a
catastrophe and of how they have been altered by "protect ion" systems.
Items include the movement of flood waves, how people respond in ways that
reduce or add to the losses, and how communities act in ways that reduce
or add to the total loss experienced in their boundaries.
2. Documentation of the aftermath and recovery dimensions of
economic, social, and environmental impacts (concentrating on the nine
principal processes listed in Table 1) associated with historical
catastrophes or with events at the time they occur.
3. Scientific analyses of documented impacts in order to develop
theoretical constructs for explaining what occurred and for use in
assessing the consequences of future situations.
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4. Analyses of reconstruction processes, with particular emphasis on
reconstruction at the community and regional scales, and the time period
required for recovery of the local and regional economies, environments,
and social systems.
B. Ultimate Goal.
As an ultimate planning tool, one can dream of a
multiple feedback loop simulation model that encompasses event, aftermath, and
recovery processes and the interactions among them to estimate catastrophe and
super catastrophe consequences.
The research recommended above to develop
understanding of the major processes is seen as an initial step to this
ultimate goal.
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APPENDIX I
DESCRIPTIVE REPORTS ON MAJOR CATASTROPHES
Combining Contemporary Journalistic Reports with
Assessments and Analyses by Later Observers
I.

JOHNSTOWN FLOOD, MAY 31, 1889
Information synthesized from New York Times reports.
Storm Event

The flood was caused by the breaking of a dam at the foot of a mountain
lake, about nine miles up the valley of the South Fork of the Conemough River.
The lake, between 200-300 feet above the level of Johnstown (populat ion
25,000, is 3.5 miles long and 1 to 1 1/4 miles wide. In some places it is 100
feet deep. At the time, it held more water than any other reservoir natural
or artificial in the u.S.
The lake had earlier been quadrupled in size by
artificial means and was held in check by a dam from 700 to 1,000 feet wide.
The dam was 90 feet in thickness at the base and tapered to a little more than
20 feet at the top with a height of 110 feet.
Steady rains over the preceding 48 hours increased the volume of water in
all the small mountain streams which were already swollen by earlier rains.
From available information, something in the nature of a cloud burst must have
been the culmination of the struggle of the water against the embankment.
Dam Failure
According to Herbert Webber (a guard at the South Fork Club), for three
days before the first outburst, the water of the lake forced itself out
through the interstices of the masonry, so that the front of the dam resembled
a large watering pot. The force of the water was so great that one of these
jets squirted full thirty (30) feet horizontally from the stone wall. At this
time, the streams feeding the lake resembled torrents and were carrying
3,000,000 gallons of water hourly.
Webber was present when the dam began to give way. At about 12:45 p.m.
(May 31), the stones in the center of the dam began to sink because of
undermining, and within 8 minutes a gap of 20 feet was made in the lower half
of the wall face. By 1 o'clock, the top masonry fell in, and the remainder of
the wall opened outward like twin gates.
It did not take more than 5 minutes
for the lake to drop 50 feet.
Warnings
. Recognizing the potential danger the dam posed to residents downstream,
it was inspected once a month by the Pennsylvania Railroad Engineers.
The
inspections showed that nothing less than some convulsion of nature would tear
the barrier away.
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For over a year, there were fears of an accident of the magnitude that
occurred.
The foundations of the dam were considered to be shaky in the
Many increasing leakages were reported from time
spring before the disaster.
to time.
Webber said he had repeatedly called the attention of the members of
South Fork Club (owners of the dam) to the many leakages. He was always told
that the dam was all right; that it had been "built to stand for centuries"
and that its giving way was impossible.
Webber next laid his complaints
before the mayor who promised to investigate but did nothing.
Opinions are divided as to whether sufficient warning was given to
residents on the day of the disaster.
According to people who live in
Johnstown and other surrounding towns, ample warning was given to the
Johnstown folks by the railroad officials and by other gentlemen of standing
and reputation.
In many cases, these warnings were utterly disregarded.
Severity
- The Little Juniata, Frankstown Branch and Juniata Rivers that
the year are mere brooks, were over thirty (30) feet deep.

for most of

- The flood depth was over 20 feet in Johnstown.
Lake level dropped 50 feet in 5 minutes.
Damages
- Below the dam for a distance of 3/4 mile stretched a mighty mass of
wreckage, 40-60 feet high and 700-800 feet wide. The wreckage contained dead
persons.
- Dead bodies could be seen in the river as far away as Pittsburgh (100 miles
from th'e scene of the disaster).
- At one point on the river, a telegraph operator counted 63 bodies 1.n 20
minutes floating past on the day of the disaster.
- At 6 o'clock on the day of the disaster, a Superintendent of the
Pennsylvan ia Railroad (Robert Pitcain) telegraphed from San Hollow west of
Johnstown, that he had seen about 200 persons afloat on gondola cars,
shanties, etc. and that the disaster was appalling.
- A telegraph operator and San Harbour, in the Pennsylvania Railroad tower,
said that at least 75 bodies had floated past that point.
- The scene of the disaster was cutoff entirely from all communication.
48 hours after the disaster, communication had not been restored.

Even

- Houses, bridges and factories were overwhelmed in the twinkling of an eye.
Also destroyed were railroads and telegraph lines.
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- All railroad and wagon bridges were swept downstream in a watery avalanche.
Countless houses that were never dreamed to be in any danger of flooding were
also swept away.
- The Pennsylvania Railroad was submerged for a distance of 30 mi les.
The
Blairsville Railroad bridge was swept away together with a train of loaded
coal cars which had been run upon it with the idea of holding the bridge in
place. The bridge was 875 feet long with 500 feet of trestle.
- Western Union's nearest point of communication was New Florence) 14 miles
west of Johnstown.
It was impossible to communicate with that locality from
the east.
- A week after the disaster, careful est imates placed the number of bod ies
recovered at half of those that had perished. Out of a population of 30,000,
18,000 had made themselves known to the Registration Office. It was estimated
that some of the people missing had left town and that about 10% of the
survivors would fail to make their identity known.
City officials estimated
that at the outside, not more than 21,000 or 22,000 would be accounted for;
leaving 8,000 or 9,000 dead.
- It was est imated that about $3,000,000 would
wreckage from Johnstown and its vicinity.

be required

to clear

the

Assessments
- It was alleged that the dam was formerly a small affair that had been
enlarged by the South Fork Club to hold four times as much water as before.
Referring to the enlargement of the dam, Engineer Church (formerly Chief and
then Consulting Engineer of the Aqueduct Commission) said that on general
principles it was unwise to enlarge any masonry dam that had not originally
been built for future enlargement.
From the little definite infor.mation
available, he was inclined to think that the wasteway of the dam was too small
to pass the unusual amount of water coming downstream) and that the dam had
failed on that account.
In response to safety concerns raised by opponents of the great Quaker
Bridge Dam, (a dam under consideration for construction at the time) he said,
lithe new dam will have provisions made for safely carrying off a flood 60
times greater than ever occurred in that locality and the dam itself will be
able to hold back all the water that can be forced against it.
And even if
the dam should break and its waters be precipitated into the Hudson, the river
would not be affected sufficiently to even show a rise at Sing Sing."

II.

GALVESTON, TEXAS, HURRICANE, SEPT. 8, 1900
As reported in the New York Times

Galveston Island on which the City of Galveston is situated, is 28 miles
long and 1 1/2 to 3 1/2 miles wide.
It is 4-5 feet above tide level.
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Severity
- Wind speed of over 80 mph.
- Water was 3 feet in the rotunda of the Tremont Hote 1 and 6 feet in Market
Street.
In a great majority of cases, the streets were submerged to a depth
of 10 feet. The highest level of land in the city was 4-5 feet under water.
- Relief trains sent out to Galveston had to return as they could not get
closer than 6 miles of Virginia Point where the Prairie was covered with
lumber, debris, pianos, trucks and dead bodies.
Damages
- Four bridges, the main link between Galveston and the mainland, were swept
away by the terrible force of wind and water in the bay. Three of the bridges
were for railroad use, and one was the Galveston County Public Wagon and
pedestrian bridge.
- All forms of communication between Galveston and the outside world were
disrupted. Telegraph and telephone lines were destroyed.
- The water works and power house were wrecked.
threatened. The city was in darkness.

Severe water shortage was

- At least 5,000 families had no shelter.
- Death toll estimated at 5,000.
- Property loss was estimated to be $15 to $20 million.
Reconstruction
- Five days after the disaster, some businesses put men to work to begin to
repair· the damages.
However, most commerc ial interests seemed too uncertain
to follow the lead of those showing faith in the rapid rehabilitation of the
island city.
Most businessmen were waiting to see what the attitude of the
railroads, especially the Southern Pacific, would be. Reporters felt that the
decision of the transportation lines, more than anything else, would restore
confidence and speed reconstruction.
III. SAN FRANCISCO EARTHQUAKE AND FIRE, APRIL 18, 1906
As reported in the New York Times, April 19.
Earthquake
- Over 500 dead and $200,000,000 worth of property destroyed.
- Nearly half of the city is in ruins.
- 50,000 homeless and 1,000 injured.

44
- Water supply fails.
- Telegraph and telephone cutoff for a time. Western Union was completely out
of business. Only the post office managed to send out a wire.
- Electric power was cutoff.
- Street cars could not operate since tracks were badly damaged.
also ceased operation.

Ferry boats

- Tall steel frame structures stood the strain better than did brick
buildings. A portion of City Hall which cost more than $7,000,000 collapsed.
The new post office, one of the finest in the United States, was bad ly
shattered.
Fires
- Immediately after the earthquake, fire started.
- The fire department could not respond to the emergency because the water
supply was cutoff. Hence dynamite was used to blow down buildings so as to
control the spread of the fire. This, however, proved futile.
- The south side of Market Street, from 9th Street to the bay, was soon
ablaze. The fire covered a belt two blocks wide. On this main thoroughfare
were many of the finest edifices in the city.
They included the Grant,
Parrott, Flood, Call, Examiner and Monadnock build ings and the Palace and
These were either destroyed or badly damaged.
At the same
Grand Hotels.
time, commer.cial establishments and banks north of Market Street were burning.
Claus Spreckels, a fifteen story stone and iron building was consumed by fire.
Banks and commercial houses, supposed to be fire proof (though not of modern
build) burned quickly.
- Dynamite available was not sufficient to handle the emergency hence the
mayor made an urgent appeal to the governor for more.
- Chief of pol ice ordered the closure of every Saloon in the ci ty so as to
prevent 'drink-crazed' men from rioting 1n the streets.
- Mayor Schmitz ordered bakeries and milk stations to reserve their supplies
for the homeless.
- The mayor establ ished a base of rescue.
Rescuers jumped into collapsed
buildings and pulled out the dead, the dying and the injured.
Practically
every physician volunteered his assistance, and soon a well equipped medical
corps was organized and began ministering to the injured.
Provisions were made to place tents in every park in the city.
- Every possible precaution was taken to guard property. Police turned out on
guard, and the governor and General Funston (commanding the Pacific Division
of the U.S. Army) were asked to send troops.
Soldiers were ordered to shoot
down vandals caught robbing the dead.
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- The insane asylum at Agnew was a total wreck.
270 inmates were killed out
of a total of 700 people.
Hundreds of inmates who escaped are roaming the
streets in a state of panic.
- Provisions were sold at fancy prices, and even water was sold by the glass.
- The Southern Pacific Ra ilroad carried out of town all those who wanted to
leave. No one was allowed to enter, and those who le ft were not ab le to get
back for a while.
- On April 19, the following resolution was adopted by Congress:
The Secretary of War

1S

hereby authorized and directed

-- to loan to the Mayors of the cities of San Francisco, Berkeley,
Oakland, Alameda and such other cities on the Pacific Coast as have sustained
damage, under such regulat ions and restrictions as he may deem proper, a
sufficient number of tents to temporarily shelter such persons as may have
been rendered homeless and lost property by the earthquake;
-- to issue rations and supplies and to render such other aid
destitute and others unable to provide for themselves;

to the

-- to work with the Secretaries of Treasury and of the Navy in extending
reI ief and ass i'stance to stricken people to the extent of the use of Naval
vessels, revenue cutters, and supplies under their control on the Pacific
Coast.
April 20
- 200,000 or about hat f of the population of San Frand sco spent the night
under open sky in the parks and other open spaces in the city.
- There was the threat of famine.
Troops and Police seized every unburned
grocery and bakery in the city and husbanded all their resources.
- Show of goodwill came from all parts of the country. Congress appropriated
$1,000,000 for the benefit of the suffers, and President Roosevelt signed it
before dark so as to make the money available immediately.
- Victims of the disaster invaded the few buildings that remained in the hope
of finding something to eat.
At the Ferry Building, a crowd of thousands
gathered begging for food and transportation across the bay.
Even men of
wealth could not obtain food with all their money. Expressman charged $10 to
$50 to haul a load of baggage or give any aid to refugees.
The situat ion
became so critical that Mayor Schmidt sent the following message to Governor
Pardee:
"Send all supplies and tents possible to Golden Gate Park.
Have
bakeries in small towns bake all the bread they can. We want bedding, food,
and tents."
- Entrepreneurs were already planning to start reconstruction. The following
advertisement was placed in the New York Times by the United Cigar Stores Co.
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"We have had ten of our stores and warehouses destroyed in San Francisco
(fortunately among our own people no lives were lost).
Our own loss of close
to $300,000 measures small in our grief and sympathy for our friends and
customers.
However, this is our policy:
We have sent ten of our best men
including our Treasurer, Director of Construction and General Superintendent
there, with orders to open TWENTY new stores immediately. We believe the city
will be rebuilt at once. We understand the damage from earthquake was small
and in the rebuilding steel construction will undoubtedly remove the
possibility of future disaster from fire or earthquake. WE WANT TO BE PART OF
THE BIG BOOM THE NEW SAN FRANCISCO will have. We believe it will be a better
and greater city than ever, and we will back our judgment with our money."
Reports on Reconstruction of the City
(edited Haas et al. 1977)
More than half of the housing and at least two-thirds of the jobs in San
Franc isco were destroyed by thi s disaster.
Free transportation was given as
an incentive to victims willing to leave the city.
300,000 victims availed
themselves of this opportunity. Between 65,000 and 75,000 never returned.
Housing
First Phase
- Temporary housing was supplied in authorized and unauthorized camps.
- The first authorized housing took the form of 8,000-10,000 tents supplied
mainly by the U.S. Army.
These tents housed more than 20,000 people during
the summer of 1906.
Unauthorized tent and shack camps housed about as many
more. Health and sanitation were worse but less rigid living conditions meant
greater freedom.
Tents were feasible because of the mild climate of
California summers.
Second Phase
- Erection of substantial wooden 2- and 3-room "cottages,1I organized in
offic ial camps in city parks and plazas close to jobs and the de s t royed
central area.
4,750 cot tages were occupied before the first severe winter
storm (January, 1907).
One year after the disaster, 6,200 cottages were
available to house 20,000 (5 percent of the homeless populat ion).
- Within 26 months of the disaster, the cottages were moved to private
property and made permanent structures. There was a high vacancy rate in the
cottages (late 1906) and high attrition when the cottages were moved from
refugee camps to private property in 1908. This is an indication that the two
moves (from tents to temporary cot tages and then to permanent homes) were
enforced prematurely for most of the families. This was particularly true for
refugees famil ies who were unskilled, foreign-born, and headed by women and
old people for whom housing and suitable rents did not exist. The pressure to
move apparently came from upper- and middle-class citizens who projected their
own return to normalcy (in jobs and homes) to be the condition of all social
groups in the city.
There seems to be a tendency for refugee camps to turn
into permanent homes for the disadvantaged.
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- In order to insulate the lower class from the housing market at a time when
rents were uncontrolled and extreme, authorities intended to allow them to
occupy emergency housing until no longer than 1910.
However, in 1911, many
families in San Francisco had still not returned to homes obtained through the
hous ing market.
- Middle and upper classes were forced to compete for housing in the market in
the summer of 1906. About 8,000 housing units were constructed between August
1906 and October 1907. This represented a replacement of about one-third of
the destroyed housing in the first eighteen months (seems low for at least
250,000 people made homeless). Thereafter, the rate of housing construction
fell to about half of this rate until 1911 by which time the city's building
stock had been replaced.
Business
- A decision to
after the 1906
real estate and
the extent of a

rebuild in San Francisco was made by a major bank four months
earthquake.
Other large financial institutions, insurance,
banking institutions followed. Their chosen locations defined
new financial district.

- As soon as the locational decisions of these financial institutions had
outlined the financial district, department stores began to build in
boundaries that defined a new apparel shopping district. Hotels came third.
Large hotels established the outlines of a new hotel district.
- It generally took longer for businesses formerly located near the edge of
the central district to reestablish themselves. These activities were forced
to take suboptimal locations for up to eight years.
As a result, some
businesses either failed or relocated outside of the disaster-stricken city.
The resulting employment losses were generally to blue collar and, to a lesser
extent, semi-skilled and unskilled workers.
In the manufacturing sector for
example, there were 450 fewer jobs in San Francisco three years after the
disaster than there were before it (1904). The exodus of manufacturing plants
dropped San Francisco's share of manufacturing employment in the Bay Area from
33% in 1904 to 23% in 1909 and 1914. This lower percentage was still holding
in 1914.
- Employment in middle- and upper-class occupations--office, administrative
and financial services, and retaiLing--increased relatively and absolutely
between 1906 and 1915.
- Other businesses that particularly suffered from the disaster were the
wholesale and manufacturing concerns dependent upon the low rents of old and
amortized buildings in near-central locations, close to the external economies
that come from the concentration of hundreds of linked activities in a tightly
circumscribed area. In San Francisco, 894 small business establishments, many
of the above type, received Relief Committee loans to rehabilitate. Two years
after the disaster, only half were self-supporting while most of the remainder
(351) were not in business. Of these, 211 were never again able to establish
a business enterprise despite the grants of the Relief Committee.
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- The financial pressures during disaster recovery placed greatest stress on
the lower social class.
They were dislocated for the largest period.
Many
were forced to locate on land unclaimed by the more affluent to sub urbanize to
East Bay towns, or to leave the Bay Area altogether.
- Most of the lower class, however, found moving permanently or temporarily to
other Bay Area towns to be not viab Ie.
Transport cost s and travel time were
too high for them to live in the East Bay and work in San Francisco.
- Most lower class decided to leave in 1906 and others did so after the
enforced closing of the refugee camps 1907-08.
A large proportion of the
300,000 people that left San Francisco in the two weeks after the disaster
were of the lower socioeconomic classes.
Seventy-four % of the unskilled
sampled in 1906 failed to return to the Bay Area by 1907, and 87% of them had
gone from the Bay Area by 1911.

IV.

FAILURE OF SAINT FRANCIS DAM, MARCH 13, 1928
Reported in the New York Times.

The Saint Francis Dam was part of the Owen Valley Aqueduct System that
supplies the City of Los Angeles and other communities in the San Fernando
Valley with water for irrigat ion and domest ic purposes.
The dam was located
in the mountains northwest of the city on the Santa Clara River about 7S miles
above the ocean.
At 1 o'clock in the morning (March 13, 1928), the dam gave way and 88,000
acre feet of stored water was instantly rushing on a mad race to the sea. The
dry bed of the Santa Clara River provided the initial flow, but soon the bank
broke and a plain up to 60 miles wide was at the mercy of the flood.
The St ate Eng ineer (Edward Hyat t, Jr.) said that according to
reports, the dam was in perfect condition before the break and that it
been inspected regularly under state supervision.

his
had

Warnings
Mrs. A. M. Rumsey, a postmistress at the nearby town of Sangus, said that
for ten (0) days before the dam break, ranchers "talked of nothing else" but
leaks in the structure and the possibility of the disaster.
A motorist reported that while driving up the canyon road, he saw an
unusual quantity of muddy water coursing through the ordinarily dry sttream
bed.
He drove up to the dam and noticed that the water behind the buttress
was within 3 feet of the top and that the spillway gates were apparently
closed, although there was a good stream running down the canyon.
Further
down the road, the motorist saw a gang of workmen drilling holes apparently in
preparation for dynamite blasts to blow off the shoulder of a hill not more
than 200 feet from the dam.
At the time of failure, warnings were telephoned to residents below the
dam but apparently insufficient time was available for people living in the
upper part of the canyon to flee.
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Severity
- The dam break occurred at 1 a.m. and in 3 hours, the flood wave was 20 miles
down the valley moving at about 10 feet per second.
- Silt deposited in some sections of the Santa Clara River bed was 30 feet
deep.
- Only the central section of the dam was left standing.
The east and west
sections had been eroded away by the water released from the reservo ir
stretching 5 miles up the canyon from the dam site.
Damages
- The Los Angeles municipal power house below the dam was demolished.
- 500 homes were destroyed or greatly damaged.
- Ten important bridges were destroyed including the railway bridge between
Ventura and Oxnard. The State highway bridge at Castaic and the steel bridge
of the Southern Pacific branch from Sangus to Montalvo were also destroyed.
- State and county highways washed out at numerous points.
- Telegraph and telephone lines disrupted.
- 1500 persons were left virtually homeless,
temporarily at least, destitute.

and

many

of

these were,

- Livestock killed and drowned.
- 20 lineal miles of citrus orchards were buried under many feet of mud and
silt.
- 10,000 acres of orchards had been swept over by the flood.
Preliminary
surveys indicated that probably $500/ acre would have to be spent to restore
the silt covered area.
At the time of the disaster, the orchard land was
valued at about $5,000/acre.
- Property loss was estimated at $15,000,000 to $30,000,000.
- Death toll estimated at 400.
Assessment of the Failure 36 Years Later
(Gri swold 1964)
Dam Description
The 2-year old concave bulwark, containing 137,000 cubic yards of
reinforced concrete, rose 205 feet above the narrow streambed in San
Francisquito Canyon.
Its crestline measured 700 feet.
The dam was 180 feet
thick at its base and tapered to 16 feet at the top.
Behind it lay a four-
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mile long reservoir.
At the moment of the disaster, the dam held about 12
billion gallons of water.
severity
- 10,000 ton chunks of concrete, the size of bungalows were tumbled as far as
3/4 mile by the towering dark wall of water that lunged down the San
Francisquito Canyon.
- Only the dams center section, 205 feet high and about 100 feet wide resisted
the tremendous pressures.
- The plunging torrent from the broken dam, swelled to a flow greater than
500,000 cfs, reached a depth of 125 feet as it tore at the curves of it s
tortuous channel.
- One and a half miles down the canyon, stood Los Angeles' Municipal Power
Plant No.2.
It was a two-story building of heavily reinforced concrete,
containing two-lOO ton dynamos. Close by huddled a settlement of 65 persons.
- Five minutes after the dam crumbled, this community was swept away.
- The power house, struck by a flood wave that rose even higher than 125 feet,
was obliterated as if it had been a tent.
- Half an hour after the collapse, the plunging waters were still 50-feet deep
and scoured out the contents of the canyon.
- 38 miles below the dam, the flood wave was 25 feet high.
Damages
- An estimated 450 lives were lost.
accurate count is not available.

Even 36 years after the disaster, an

- 8,000 acres of productive land were laid to waste.
- Unnumbered herds of livestock and flocks of poultry were killed.
- Economic losses were estimated at $10 million.
Reasons for Failure
- 72 year old William Mulholland, Chief Engineer of the L.A. Water and Power
Dept. took full responsibility for the dam's design and location.
Said he,
II If ·r was
to build St. Francis Dam again, I would build it in the same manner,
but not in the same place.
That place where it was built was vulnerable
against human aggression. 1I
- "Unfortunately," the investigators appointed by the Governor to seek out the
cause for dam failure wrote, "in this case the foundation under the entire dam
left very much to be desired." The rocky cleft of the canyon, which the dam
straddled, consisted of an insubstantial mica schist on the east side and an
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even less substantial reddish conglomerate on the west, the report explained.
The two rock formations met, under the west wing of the dam, along a "dead"
earthquake fault, ideally designed by nature for seepage.
To make matters
worse, the conglomerate "even when dry was of decidedly inferior strength ••.
when wet, became so soft that most of it lost almost all rock
characteristics." The investigators concluded that "the ultimate failure of
this dam was inevitable, unless waster could have been kept from reaching the
foundation."
V.

LYNMOUTH, ENGLAND FLOOD, AUGUST 15, 1952
(Delderfield 1953)

Heavy rains on the night of August 15, 1952, caused the biggest flood
from the smallest area ever known in England.
Lynmouth is a fi shing and
vacation village immortalized by poets Shelley and Southey and by Blackmore in
the novel, Lorna Doone.
The flood produced a wall of water up to 40 feet high and moving at 20
mph. Bridges, 10-ton boulders went through walls like bullets through paper,
water scouring undercut the foundations of buildings that had been untouched
for 200 years. The river drops several hundred feet in the last half-a-mile
to the sea.
A total of 34 people were drowned.
destroyed, 28 bridges, 132 vehicles.

93 houses and buildings were

Some descriptive phrases:
p.28 - "The party •• was in pitch darkness and soaked to the skin, in complete
ignorance of what was happening elsewhere and had an overriding anxiety about
the whole situation."
p.29 - .JtTime ceased to exist for most of those concerned"
p.31 - itA particularly violent roar was heard above the general tumult."
p.34 - "Some ideal of the awful force of the water may be gleaned from the
fact that the body of nine-year-old Kenneth Bowen, who was swept away from the
same house, was found under a s lab In a butcher I s shop in the Watersmeet
Road. "
p.38 - "At intervals in the hours that followed, the sixty occupants of the
hotel mounted floor by floor until they were at the top of the building.
Provided with rugs, blankets, and eiderdowns but without light, heat, food or
drink, they sat together as the interminable hours dragged by.
It was an
agonizing period of suspense.
In the direct course of the flooded rives and in the path of the pounding
debris, the hotel received a severe bat tering for hours on end.
The very
walls seemed to rock and the groaning and straining of timbers, together with
the roar of the waters, the thunder and 1 ightning, and the whimpering of
terror- st ricken children was a nightmare experience, which wi 11 never be
forgotten by those who were unfortunate enough to take part in it.1I
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p.41 - the· greatest bravery was being shown in every corner of the litt le
town. 1I
p.44 - scores of people were trapped in buildings beside the river with a
cliff rising steeply behind them.
p.65 - the force of the scouring water caused so much destruction that the
town was not recognizable even by those who knew it best.
p.66 - The Rhenish Tower, which must have figured in millions of holiday
snapshots, had disappeared.
p.86 - '~erhaps as heartening to the people as anything else was the concern
and interest displayed in their trouble by Her Majesty's Ministers and other
important personages."
Large amounts of volunteer labor, government sponsored workers,
donations had the town reopened by early September.
VI.

and

NEW YORK TIMES ACCOUNT OF HURRICANE CAMILLE, AUGUST 18, 1969
Reports by Associated Press in the New York Times.

- Wind speeds of up to 150 mph with high tides and tornadoes.
- 200,000 people fled inland from Mississippi's coastal area during the day.
- According to the police superintendent, Gulfport 00,000) was completely
destroyed, and the Memorial Hospital was calling for help.
The city had no
power and no communication with the outside.
- The Weather Bureau warned of tides driven by the winds to heights of up to
20 feet in the area of maximum storm power.
- Red Cross reported that 394 evacuation shelters had been set up in the storm
area. Reports indicated that 44,541 refugees were in the shelters with more
coming in.
- In Gulfport, nearly all refugee centers had run out of food and water before
the storm arrived.
- Most of the low lying areas in Louisiana were cleared early in a scramble
that started with the first warnings.
- Traffic on highways leading inland from Mississippi's coast was frequently
bumper to bumper during the day. Many of Alabama's coastal exodus headed for
Mobile.
Authorities said 5,500 re
s were in the city's seven emergency
centers.
- Rising tides covered highways near the coast in Mississippi and Alabama.
Other South Mississippi highways were closed in the night by the highway
patrol because of debris.
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- The Mississippi River Bridge was closed to traffic.
The world's longest
bridge, the 26-mile causeway across Lake Pontchartrain was blocked off.
- Most of the city's activity was in groceries and drug stores and they were
jammed on a Sunday when they would normally be closed. Customers were trying
to buy flashlights, flashlight and radio batteries or candles. But they were
no where to be found.
- Long lines formed at gasoline stations.
August 19
- Civil defense officials 1n Mississippi reported 100 dead from along the
Coast and expected the toll to increase to between 150 and 200.
- Fires burned out of control because fire
them. Communications were disrupted.

fighting units could not reach

- Most of the Gulf Coast was without electricity, gas or drinking water.
- Red Cross reported its shelters housed more than 70,000
Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi during the night.

persons ln

- The Buena Vista Hotel on the Coast of Biloxi had water 8 feet deep on its
ground floor, destroying all the facilities of radio station WLOX.
Reports on Effects in the Construction Industry
Hurricane Camille caused substantial shortages of both labor and
materials for reconstruction along the Mississippi Gulf Coast. Mr. George P.
Hopkins, Jr. (past president of the Mississippi Gulf Coast Chapter of the
Assoc iated General Contrac tors) appeared be fore the Senate Subcommi ttee on
Disaster Relief of the Committee of Public Works to describe the situation
five months after the disaster. He felt that the amount of work required for
restoration exceeded their industry's capabilities as they existed before the
disaster.
Asked, whether construction costs in the area after the disaster
had gone up d isproport iona te ly to the rest of the country, Mr. Hopkins
replied:
"I would say immediately following the storm, when the tremendous
influx came into the area and at one time we checked with the Better
Business Bureau, we had over 700 foreign construction firms or
individuals in the area. I would say yes, the costs did go up. Even
in my own business the people that we had subcontracted on some items
such as roofing, and that sort, I couldn't hire them for twice what I
paid them 6 months before.
In that line, I am talking about the
shinglers. They saw an opportunity and they hit it . • • , To some
extent, it is not completely justified, but you can understand that
when a man has 15 places he is going to go, he is going to go where
he can do the best •• , , In my own business, I had at least a half
dozen of my men quit and go into the construction business because of
this fact," (Hopkins, 1970).
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- The primary shortage in the aftermath of the disaster was labor.
Common
laborers who got $2.00 per hour prior to the disaster were getting up to $7.00
per hour in the post-disaster recovery period.
Labor costs were typically
more than doubled.
- There was also a critical shortage of skilled laborers such as plumbers and
electric ians.
This necessitated import ing skilled workers from other market
areas at premium rates.
The importation aggravated the shortage of living
. accommodations, caused rents to rise, increased subsistence costs, and
contributed to the high labor costs.
- Increased demand also caused difficulty in obtaining construction materials
and equipment.
In addition valuable supplies were destroyed by the hurricane.
The resulting shortage increased the cost of building materials and equipment.
For example, a cherry picker with operator which rented for $12-16 per hour
prior to the storm, rented for $25 per hour during the period following the
disaster.
The shortage of building materials would have been worse had
stockpiled items not been available from military and other government depots.
- The availability of federal money and low interest loans from the Small
Business Administrat ion (SBA) increased the demand for immed ia te repa irs.
Many complained that prices went up substantially, even astronomically, under
the temptation of money brought in by SBA, insurance adjustments, and other
monies.
This was brought out by Mr. Hopkins in his testimony before the
Senate Subcommittee on Disaster Rel tef of the Committee on Public Works.
On
the price gouging problem, he said:
"I know it has happened, but I cannot speak from personal
experience.
I have talked to people who have been approached and the
prices presented to them were out of line.
I can give you one
personal experience.
Immediately after the storm an insurance
adjustor came to me from another area and said 'Look, this is an
estimate I have on damage. What is it?'
I said, 'Well, I have not
the time to go look at it, but you tell me what you have done and how
you would adjust it.' And he told me this figure. From his figure I
could tell him he was reasonable. I told him to go back to the owner
with the estimate he had, which should have been $10,000 instead of
$19,000.
He went to the owner and gave him the estimate and they
settled for $10,000. This is the only case I came across personally,
but it has happened." (Hopkins, 1970)

Reports from Congress
Congressional Record, Sept. 3, 1969
Damages
- Representative Colmer of Mississippi reported that millions of dollars of
timber, as well as the tung oil orchards and the pecan industry, on the
shoreline and the interior, were devastated.
Conservative estimates show $1
billion in damage.
Thousands of homes, hundreds of beautiful motels and
hotels, and many miles of highways were destroyed.
Possibly as many as 300
people lost their lives.
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- Representative McCormack from Massachusetts suggested that, if the disaster
loan 1 aw and other exist ing laws were not adequate to meet some of the
situations, Congress should act very rapidly and very quickly to pass
additional legislation.
- Representat ive Keith from Massachusetts stressed the need for a national
disaster policy on the part of the Federal Government, to replace the present
piecemeal approach to the problem.
The largest damages from hurricanes are
due to the abnormally high tides for which there is no insurance.
Citizens
can collect insurance for wind, rain, and flood damage; but they cannot
collect for the damage caused by the abnormally high tides wh ich inevitably
accompany the storms.
There should be a national policy covering such
situations.
Assistance Provided by the USDA
- Over 3 million pounds of food from school lunch and commodity distribution
supplies were transported to hurricane victims.

- On a typical day, 38,975 storm victims received food through USDA to take
home to feed their families, and 25,215 received food from USDA stocks at mass
feeding stations.
- Jeep-mounted mist sprayers were used to treat the beach areas with malathion
insec tic ide so as to ki 11 flies, mosquitoes, and other pests which spread
diseases.
- The Agricultural Research Service moved to combat another insect threat,
fire ants. These ants were scattered by the winds and waters into homes and
debris.
100,000 pounds of poison bait was used to protect workers and
refugees.
Many were already reported bitten by the fire ants and some
required hospitalization.
Comments
Poisonous, disease spread ing, and obnoxious insects could easily be
carried by a dam break flood.
This requires added medical facilities for
treating victims and care to find poisons for removing the insects that will
not lead to later environmental or health problems.

VII.

FLOODS IN BRISTOL, ENGLAND, JULY 11, 1970
Background

As reported by Smith et al. (1980), the flood occurred in the early hours
of July 11. The extent of flooding was unexpected as the flood peak coincided
with a spring high tide. Those flooded had minimal previous flood experience.
Homes were covered with the stinking mud of diluted sewage.

56
Results
- The flooding significantly increased physical and psychiatric ill-heal th.
Physical problems were more common in males and psychiatric problems in
females.
- There was a large increase in the attendance of men living in flooded areas
to general practit ioners.
Women's attendance inc reas ed much les s.
The
increased attendance was most pronounced among people whose homes had had more
than 4 ft of water through them.
- Hospital referrals and admissions were more than doubled for a year after
the floods. The greatest increase was among men.
- The mortality rate among flood victims rose by 50%.
The most pronounced
rise was in the age group of 45 to 64 where male deaths rose from 7 to 20 and
female deaths from 5 to 9. These deaths occurred mainly in the third 3-month
period after the flooding.
Analysis
possible factors making the population of Bristol vulnerable to the stress
resulting from the flood would include the unexpected nature of the event and
a general lack of flood experience.
The high proportion of older people in
the community may have also contributed.
s

These reports do not cover the causes of physical illness or the reasons
for greater incidence among men. One would suppose that the sewage contained
slowly acting virus or toxics.
Men may have been more actively involved in
cleaning the putrid mass from the homes.
Women could have been
psychologically impacted by a greater sense of loss of cherished possessions
and by seeing their husbands' health deteriorate.
HURRICANE AGNES
Reports by John Darnston in the New York Times

VIII.

June 20, 1972
An overnight torrent of rain brought more than 10 inches in 24 hrs. Flood
waters reached depths of 15 feet in some low lying areas in Westchester
County.
Flooded railroad tracks halted traffic for hours.
Traffic was
chaotic on local streets and approaches to the city in parts of Northern New
Jersey, Rockland and Westchester Count
, and Southern Connect icut.
More
than 10,000 telephone were reported out in Scarsdale. Many local streets were
impassable. There were no traffic signs advising motorists which streets were
safe.
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June 23, 1972
Twenty-six persons dead and many missing.
Bridges in affected areas were
washed out and some communities, such as Wellsville, became virtual islands.
Many of the dead were motorists who drove off washed out bridges or who
suddenly found themselves in the middle of swirling waters.
Virginia:
6 persons drowned and at least 5 missing.
Property damage
est imated to be in the mill ions; 46 primary highways and 600 secondary
highways closed because of flooding.
Chesapeake and Ohio Railway closed its
tracks for 165 miles.
Drinking water declared unsafe in many communities.
Thousands of people without electricity and telephone service.
North Carolina:

2 dead; 27 roads impassable.

Maryland:
12
electric ity.

persons

Delaware:

reported missing or dead.

100,000 homes without

1 person dead.

Pennsylvania:
13 persons were dead and 9 missing.
Capitol was closed off.

Harr i sb urg ,

the

St at e

June 24, 1972
Over 75 persons died since stonn started.
Five states declared disaster
areas.
Th e Was hi n g t on are a wa t e r sup ply for 1. 2 mill i on p e 0 pIe was
threatened. Sewage backup posed health threat.
Damage was particularly heavy along the Susquehanna River.
river rose 32 feet; 10 feet above flood level.

[n places, the

[~ Virginia, the James River crested more than 35 feet breaking the record
of 30 feet set in 1771.
In the southern tier of New York, the Allengheny
started to spillover 25 foot high dikes.

June 25, 1972
100 dead and more than 1/2 million homeless.
June 26, 1972
122 persons dead since start of floods.
By states, this breaks down to:
Pennsylvania
47
New York
23
Virginia
17
Maryland
15
Total estimated damage amounts to $1.6 billion.
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Later Analysis by Allee, Barnaba and Schempp (1975)
Severity
Lan d s 1 ide s con t rib ute d t o t he dis r u p t ion 0 f c omm u n i cat ion r 0 ute s ,
including highways, railroads, pipelines and power transmission lines.
A
total of 24 counties were included in a declared Presidential Disaster Area.
Normal Damages
Total property damage $3.5 billion
- Agricultural:
Crops
Land
Buildings
Livestock
Fences
Machinery &
Equipment
- Death toll:

$102 million made up of the following:
$71 * 10 6
$25 * 10 6
$3 * 10 6
$0.32 * 10 6
$0.515 * 10 6

$1.7

*

10 6

122 people.

- Personal income in the hardest hit counties (Chemung and Steubeng) fell by
15.3% of 1971 levels or by a total of $121 million.
Congressional Reactions
Hon. Charles A. Vanik of Ohio; June 28, 1972.
Source: Congressional Record, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session Vol. 118, June 1-29,
1972 .

wind and rain caused extensive damage particularly in communities which
lie along the shore of Lake Erie.
Congressmen request Federal assi stance for the protect ion of nonpubl ic
shorelines in areas where benefit-cost ratios would justify such Federal
assistance.
Even though Hurricane Agnes caused some damage, he argued that erosion
the maIn concern of the residents.

IS

In some places, 30 feet of shoreline disappear every year into the waters
of the lake.
By the year 2020, 535 acres of land are expected to be lost wi thin a 4mile stretch. The present value of the property amounts to $18.9 million.
Total tax revenue lost to the community would be $3,861,000.
Intangible:
80% of eroded material will remain suspended
thereby increasing pollution.

m

the

lake
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Cost of totally protecting 4 mile shoreline 01,700 feet long section} is
$2,547,000 or $217/ft.
Corps
projects.

of

Engineers

should

not

use market

discount

rate

to

appraise

Corps of Engineers should change the procedure whereby only 50 years
lifespan is assigned to projects for economic analysis even though some
projects have 200 years of useful life.
Later Assessments
- Hurricane Agnes caused property damage to the tune of $3.5 billion.
As a
result of this high property damage, demand for contractors who could
accomplish repair work was high.
It was so difficult to get competent
contractors that, the Navy's Seabees and the Air Forces' Red Horse Squadrons
(Engineers) helped the Army Corps of Engineers get electricity into homes.
The Navy assigned 100 men who had the expertise to restore power to 200 homes
a day.
The Corps of Engineers employed up to 800 contract workers a day in
the Scranton and Wilkes-Barre regions (two severely hit areas) to clean up
houses and businesses immediately after the disaster.
- The Corps of Engineers, charged with supervising the repair work done by
private contractors under its repair program, was quickly faced with the
problem of depleted building supplies in warehouses as far away as
Philadelphia.
- In addition there was an acute shortage of labor.
Laborers who could be
obtained were often unskilled, expensive and undependable.
- The shortage of building supplies and labor resulted in high repair costs.
For example, one company was hired under the Mini-Repair Program (i.e.
replac·ement of doors, windows, stairs, and electrical, plumbing and heating
systems) to repair 1000 flood damaged homes in Wyoming Valley. Estimated cost
of repair by the Corps of Engineers was $1.4 million.
The company repaired
only 808 homes and charged the federal government over $3.5 million.
The
company blamed the high costs on unforseen high prices for supplies and labor.
- Imported labor was brought into the region.
These ext ra costs were also
included in the expenses of the company mentioned above.
The expense sheet
showed a cost of more than $400,000 for mobilization, which included flying in
personnel from such far away places as Montana, Idaho, Cal i fornia and North
Dakota as well as local living expenses and equipment costs (Philadelphia
Inquirer, 1974; reported in Yancey, 1975),
- Inspections made by the Corps of Engineers of houses repaired under the
Mini-Repair Program showed poor qual ity workmanship.
The work done by some
contractors was so bad that they became known among Corps inspectors as the
"Dirty Dozen." One such company bid on so many mini-repair contracts that it
fell weeks behind its scheduled completion dates.
Some of the contracts
awarded to that company had to be taken away and given to other contractors,
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thus compounding the delays and
1974; reported in Yancey, 1975).

increased

costs.

(Philadelphia

Inquirer,

- In the aftermath of Agnes, con men and flim-flam artists entered the
disaster areas. They posed as contractors and offered to put houses back into
shape.
After a gullible or frantic homeowner made a down payment, the
"contractor" would never return (Corp of Engineers, 1972).
Comments
These losses were distributed over a much larger area than one wou ld
expect as the direct result of a dam-break flood.
However, the sort of
meteorological event that would generate hydrologic dam failure is also likely
to cause dispersed flooding over a large area.
One can speculate as to the
marginal additional losses had a major dam in Pennsylvania failed during
Agnes.
The project pushed by Representative Yanik demonstrates a sort of "free
loading" within past disaster politics. The Lake Erie problem is a continuing
loss that is quite different than the sudden losses resulting from Agnes
flooding in Pennsylvania. Yet, political trading lets others capitalize. One
can expect a major disaster to place pressures on the Federal budget that far
exceed relief and rehabilitation costs to the directly affected community as
other areas also receive benefits through the political bargaining inherent in
passing special legislation.

IX.

BUFFALO CREEK FLOOD, WEST VIRGINIA, FEBRUARY 1972
Background

The flood occurred on 26 February 1972.
It resulted from the collapse of
a coal mine waste dump that had become a dam storing the flows from Buffalo
Creek.
During a period of heavy rain, the waste heap collapsed without
warning; 132 million gallons of water and sludge rushed down the l8-mile long
valley of Buffalo Creek completely demolishing the first villages hit; 125
people were killed and 4,000 of the areas 5,000 inhabitants were made homeless
(Erikson, 1976a).
Litigation was initiated by 625 survivors of the Buffalo Creek flood who
refused to settle with the coal company claims office.
In an out of court
settlement, the survivors were awarded $13.5 million, $6 million of which was
distributed on the basis of a point system as compensation for psychological
damages (Stern, 1976).
Results
Disabling psychiatric symptoms such as anxiety, depression, changes 1.n
character and lifestyle, and maladjustments and developmental problems in
children were still evident more than 2 years after the disaster in over 90%
of the people examined (Titchener and Kapp, 1976).
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- Collective trauma (defined by Erikson, 1976a as a blow to the tissues of
social 1 He that damages the bonds linking people together and impairs the
prevailing sense of community) existed side by side with individual trauma at
Buffalo Creek.
This is reflected in the impact on the Buffalo Creek victims
of the loss of their community (Erikson 1976b). Erikson, and Lifton and Olson
(1976) felt that the placement policy in the refugee camps (first come-first
severed with no regard for former neighborhood ties) contributed greatly to
the disintegration individual (and family) social support systems from their
communities.
- Death or survivor guilt: the guilt of having survived while others perished
and a feeling that one could have done more to help others (Lifton and Olson,
1976) .
- Death imprint and
associated with death,
acute fear 0 f rain
irrational behavior to

death anxiety:
memories and images of the disaster
destruction and dying. This was often manifested by an
and water.
Afterwards, even minor rains generated
watch for floods (Lifton and Olson, 1976).

Contributing Factors (Lifton and Olsen, 1976)
- The suddenness of the disaster and absence of warning:
Retie f workers
estimated that during the fi rst 24 hours after the event, 88% of the 4000
persons displaced by the water exhibited shock and incoherent thinking.
- Widespread losses:
by the flood.

Virtually no one who lives in the valley was untouched

- The callousness of the Coal Company: The publ ic felt that the coal company
was to blame for the accident and that they didn't care for anything except
coal.
- The continuing relationship of survivors to the company: Most people still
worked at the mines harboring bitter resentment while at the same time being
financially dependent on the company.
- Community isolation:
The area is geographically isolated and has been
socially self-supporting. This meant that there was little external social or
moral support to call on when the community broke down.
Comments
We are in times when court awards for "pain, suffering, mental anguish,
psychological harm" far exceed direct medical payments.
A "magnification ll
factor calculated from the ratio of total awards to direct awards would
greatly inflate losses. One could examine law cases and supporting literature
on estimating these losses to build a basis for thinking about how these
losses would multiply during a major disaster.
Perhaps an "Act of God"
reduces or eliminates legal responsibility, but the distinction between
manmade and natural causes should have little effect on the suffering that
actually occurs.
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We also see in Buffalo Creek the impacts of destroying "community" support
systems in an area where the people had no outside family or friends to turn
to. In contrast, San Francisco was a new community where nearly everyone had
the resort of going back "home".
Also, Buffalo Creek people were largely dependent on a non-cash economy.
They grew their food, traded services, helped each other out during times of
trouble in the "pioneer" spirit of pitching in to rebuild a fire-destroyed
home in a day as a community effort. Suddenly this entire support system was
gone.
One could probe the literature to analyze this as a "community" as
opposed to "individual" trauma.
X.

RAPID CITY, SOUTH DAKOTA, FLOOD, JUNE 9, 1972
White (1975)
Severity

- Torrential rains (more than half of the 24-inch annual average) over a 99square mile catchment caused surface runoff to cascade into the stream. Flows
down the canyon carried trees, boulders, and buildings.
Canyon Lake swelled
in volume to ten times its normal 640 acre feet. Within 6 hours of the start
of the rains, the Canyon Lake dam burst.
Damages
- 231 lives lost.
- In December 1972, the Corps of Engineers estimated 635 buildings and 312
trailers had been destroyed and that property damage amounted to $82 million.
Congress
Efforts by Representative James Abourezk (South Dakota)
July 20, 1972
- Rapid City had more than 1,000 jobs, upward of 5,000 homes and hundreds of
businesses either completely destroyed or severely damaged.
- He advocated lowering the interest rate on Small Business Administration
disaster loans to 1%.
- Sought some sort of grant or forgiveness of Loans.
disaster loan may be forgiven.

Presently $2,500 of

- Asking for up to 90% forgiveness of disaster loans.
- In Rapid City, a 90% forgiveness feature would cost the Government roughly
$45 million--not even one third of what has been given to foreign governments
for disasters in the last six years.
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September 27, 1972
- More than one foot of rain fell.
- Dams broke.
- Water crushed more than 1,000 homes.
- 240 persons dead.
- The flood cut a swath several blocks wide through the entire length of Rapid
City. Homes, cars, trees, etc. were strewn along that path.
- The dam is out and if heavy spring flooding occurs from all the snow that
accumulates in the Black Hills in a typical South Dakota winter, the high flow
will be repeated.
- People of Rapid City have decided not to permit any development in that
flood zone. The city will rebuild on safer, higher ground and place a park as
a memorial to those who died and suffered where it would not be safe to locate
businesses and homes.
- Rapid City plans to use the Urban Renewal Program.
million.

Has applied for $87

- Property tax base has been dealt a devastating blow.
- Tourism did not materialize as people stayed away from Rapid City despite
urgings to the contrary.
- Loss is between 15-33%.
- Unemployment remains high.
43,000 people.

Hundreds of bus inesses were lost in a town of
Comments

The Federal assistance programs do drive up prices by bringing more
reconstruction money into the community than the local construction industry
can assimilate, particularly in a city so isolated from others of its size.
One wonders whether the feeling of loss presented by Congressman Abourezk
continues 14 years later or whether the new and improved city after
reconstruction is actually more thriving.
XI. AUSTRALIAN FLOODS OF 1974: CASE STUDIES OF THE
EFFECTS OF DISASTER ON HEALTH
a.

Richmond River Flood (Smith et al., 1980)
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Background
In March 1974, a laO-year flood on the Richmond River inundated the
northern New South Wales town of Lismore causing major property damage and
community disruption. Most shops were inundated to a depth of over 2.5 m (8.2
ft) above floor level and about 400 houses (out of 1900 in the flood-prone
area) were inundated to depths of up to 3 m (9.8 ft).
Results
After-the-flood studies documented several negative health effects:

i. Smith et a1. (1979), (reported in Smith et a1., 1980) found that 8% of
flooded households claimed that the flood had an adverse effect on health.
Older people (over 45) or those with over 0.5 m 0.6 ft) of water in their
homes were most affected.
ii. Petroff and Leatch (1975) (reported in Smith et al., 1980) found that
the flood precipitated an increase in outpatient attendances at their
psychiatric clinic in Lismore.
Ill.
Further studies by Smith et
does not appear to have increased the
it may have affected the pattern of
houses were severely flooded (ie. had
floor). In this group, the number of
of female admissions halved.

a1. (980), showed that while the flood
number of hospital admissions or deaths,
admissions especially among those whose
more than 1 m (3.3 ft) of water over the
male admissions doubled while the number

Although there was no overall change in total numbers of deaths, deaths
from heart disease increased significantly in the year following the flood for.
the whole of Lismore. No satisfactory explanation was found for this trend.
b.

Brisbane Flood

Background
According to Smith et a1. (980), in January 1974, a substantial
proportion of Brisbane, including the business district was flooded.
About
13,000 dwellings were affected.
7,500 were flooded and nearly 100 were
totally destroyed.
12 lives were lost.
The population had no prior flood
experience and was completely unprepared and did not comprehend the flood
warnings issued.
Results
- No increase in mortality after the flood was observed.
Significant increase was observed on the number of visits to general
practlt10ners, hospitals, and specialists. Among those seeking medical care,
the predominant symptoms were persistent psychological symptoms which include
irritability, nervous tension and depression.
- Consumption of sleeping tablets and psychotropic drugs rose.
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- The impact of the floods on health was greatest for people over 35 years of
age, probably because they were more likely to be householders.
- Women under 65 years of age had more psychiatric symptoms than men, but this
sex d i fferenc e disappeared in those over 65 years.
The higher level of
psychiatric symptoms in women is thought to be due to the fact that the
housewife is confronted with the damage all day. The men are back at work.
Comments
Homes are an economic investment to which we acquire great personal
attachment. Their sudden loss is a traumatic blow that women, who feel the
primary responsibility in our society for their attractiveness, experience
more deeply than men.
XII.

SAN FRANCISCO BAY REGION FLOODS OF JANUARY 1982
As described by Brown (1982)
Severity

Twenty-five inches of rain in 32 hours dropped on the coastal mountains
initiating many hundreds of debris flows. Debris consisted of mud, rock, and
trees. Flowrates exceeded 10 ft per second and destroyed bridges, pipelines,
communication networks and roads.
Early estimates indicated a storm return
period of over 100 years.
Detailed analyses later indicated that at most
locations rainfall amounts were 1- to 40-year range.
Losses
Public property
Private

$109 * 10 6
$172.4 * 10 6

Homes damaged or
destroyed
Businesses
Deaths

6,500
1,000
33
Synergism

- No regional flood warning system is available to provide real-time data on
rainfall intensity and accumulated volumes and on corresponding stream flows.
Rainfall amounts were found to be 150 to 250 percent above those forecast by
the National Weather Service.
- No regional central ized system exists for
emergency response centers for interpretation.

transmission of the data to

- Despite abundant information about geologic and hydrologic hazard areas
produced and distributed during the past two decades, local governments
consistently permitted development in those areas during that time.
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- Many flood control channels, bridges, culverts and other drainage systems
proved inadequate to handle the combination of water and debris that resulted
from the intense storms, even though the systems were designed to carry the
volumes of water that actually occurred.
- Debris control structures such as those found in Southern California, Japan,
and Italy are virtually nonexistent in the San Franc isco region.
Limited
damage from earlier debris flows, the small number of places where debris
flows occur repeatedly and the limited population on hillslopes and in canyons
have apparently combined as factors against construction of debris basins or
similar structures.
Comments
1. Flood frequency analysis depends on the parameter being analyzed. The
parameter could be rain (over many time periods), flow, flood stage
considering the accentuating effect of the debris, or damage. This complexity
is often insufficiently reckoned into engineering design.
2.
The relatively large portion of the damages inflicted on publ ic
property, part icularly when added to public responsibility for losses to
private property, places a large financial burden that reduces services and
values received from services for years.
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APPENDIX II
NOTES AND COMMENTS ON SUPPLEMENTAL READINGS
1.

Dam Safety

Baecher et a1. (980) presented a procedure appl ying ut i lity theory,
estimation of economics damages, and historical rates of dam failure in the
low-probability/high-consequence (LP/HC) risk analysis of dam safety programs.
Utility theory provides valuable baCkground for assessing dam-failure losses,
but catastrophic losses impact individuals far beyond their most imaginative
anticipations. The application should come through studies for helping people
quant ify utility by communicat ion with computer graphics and studies for
measuring utility at a larger scale from a community perspective.
In his review of potential dam failures, Ayaswamy et a1. (974) state
that as many as 200,000 fatalities could now be caused by a major dam failure
in California. Pate-Cornell and Tagaras (1986) quote the U.S. Department of
the Interior review of the proposed Auburn Folsom-South Central Valley Project
as stating that a IIsudden and complete collapse of [Auburn] dam when the
reservoir was fu 11 would imperial the lives of 750,000 persons. II Niehaus et
al. (in Waller and Covello, 1984) make the case that engineering designs that
reduce the expected value of losses often increase the potential for
catastrophe.
For example, aviation advances concentrate deaths in airplane
accidents in a few large events and thus reduce high-probability/low
consequence risks by accentuating LP/HC risks.
In the same way, reservoir
storage controls lesser flood events even whi le creating the possibility of
much greater losses from a dam failure.
A wide variety of issues that arise in LP/HC studies were discussed at a
conference whose proceedings were edited by Waller and Covello (984).
In
addressing the uncertainties in est imating the probabil it ies of these rare
events~ J. B. Russell (1984) reported that the conference consensus was that
nno source of information should be overlooked if it can be used to more
accurately assess the frequency of low-probability events. 1I
Minarick and
Kukielka (1984) emphasized the importance of precursor events and event chains
that precede a catastrophe. Precursor sequences may be particularly important
harbinger~ of synergistic factors. Ballestero et al. (1984) used this concept
to partition raw extreme event data into subsets characterized by physical
meteorological processes that lead to major storms. Distributions were fit to
each subset and then aggregated.
The effect of human error on losses experienced during low-probability
events could be evaluated by using "human reliability analysis" in assessing
system reliability and safety (Swain 1984). The Office of Nuclear Regulatory
Research (1983) includes human error probabilities in its guide to performance
of probabilistic risk assessments for nuclear power plants. The probabilities
are based on tasks that are behaviorally similar in terms of
cues,
interpretations, response requirements, and responsibilities.
Hall (984)
discusses quantification of human performance drawn from experience in nuclear
power plants. He states that cognitive errors occur through misdiagnosis of
an off-normal event. Procedural errors are usually not severe unless multiple
errors occur sequentially.
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While experiences gathered from the nuclear power industry may be helpful
in assessing human reliability, the human errors made by people caught in
unexpected catastrophic events would be expected to be much greater than that
by trained people regularly encountering hazardous situations in nuclear power
plants.
The subjects of human error in unfamiliar circumstances and the
effect iveness of training in reducing human error during events that are
unlikely to occur during a lifetime are worth investigating.
It is difficult to assess the human contribution to "magnification"
during events larger than any that have ever occurred in North America.
However, one can speculate and novel ist scenarios may be the best medium to
use.
Vlachos (1977) discusses the use of scenarios in social impact
assessment.
Thompson and Parkinson (1984) discuss the unacceptability approach, which
views risks that exceed a given degree of consequence to be strict ly
unacceptable without regard to probability,
This is based on the ethical
principle that one is morally justified in risking only what one can afford to
lose.
Situation-specific indicators can be used to distinguish between highconsequence/low-probabil ity risk and low-consequence/h i gh- probab iIi ty ri sk
according to Thompson and Parkinson (1984), The standard indicators of death,
injury, and property damage should be supplemented with 1) Community and
Cultural Indicators, 2) Profitability Indicators (largely for low consequence
risks), 3) Probability Indicators (largely for uncertainty), and 4) Exposure
Indicators (classifying people according to perceived risk and ability of
individuals to achieve long-term goals).
Many people consider high-consequence risks to be of greater moral
significance than the more familiar medium- and low-consequence risks.
This
attitude may grow out of a philosophical commitment to the unacceptability
approach. LP/HC risk threatens not only lives but also the social, economic,
and emotional support structures which bind people into a community.
This
logic would assign nations a still greater value.
"The community represents a value perhaps above and beyond human life."
(Thompson and Parkinson 1984, p. 559.) Points given to support this view are:
1. A community is a thing of intrinsic value.
a. A prerequ1s1te for any moral action.
b. Basic needs and happiness are contingent upon the
economic structures provided by the community.
c. Such basic community forms as famiLy, friends,
represent the highest fulfillment of human purpose.

social
and

and

church

2. Loss of community causes suffering and mental anguish.
liThe
sudden loss of the entire system of support and society represents a
severe emotional trauma for survivors of a tragedy." (Erikson 1976a).
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3. Loss of community means a loss of institutions and artifacts of
recognized cultural value.
Meyer 0984, p. 338) states that "an external diseconomy may result from
the imposition of catastrophic loss risks upon the neighbors of a facility
potentially subject to a catastrophic accident."
A large dam imposes such
risks.
Regulatory agencies are more risk adverse where many people are
simultaneously at risk and require greater safety (Committee on Safety
Criteria for Dams, 1985).
"Federal guidelines for dam safety" (Committee on
the Safety of Existing Dams, 1983) require preparation of an emergency action
plan, commensurate with the dam size and location, based on a postulated dam
failure and flood inundation maps.
The plan should be coordinated with local
civil-preparedness officials and cover notification, evacuation, stockpiling
repair materials, and inventory, local repair forces, and training operating
personnel.
One caution is to avoid overlooking consequences at the
catastrophic and super catastrophic scales.
The plan itself can be effective
during disaster only to make matters worse during catastrophes.
The determinants of popular perceptions of riskiness should be
identified.
People have a clearer understand ing of the benefits and hazards
associated with dams and are thus more willing to accept them than they are
willing to accept nuclear power plants, for example. The perceptions of risk
differ although the probabilities may be similar. "Actuarial knowledge of the
fatality risks of dams does not readily clarify decisions concerning dam
safety." (Baldewicz 1984, p. 81)
There is a need to develop a theory of risk perception that predicts how
people will respond to new hazards and management strategies. (S lovic 1984)
Two goals are to improve communications of policy-makers with the lay public
and to structure effective educational efforts.
2.

Repair Cost Escalation

Yancey (975) explored 15 factors for use in determining whether repair
costs escalate after a catastrophe. The four principal ones were found to be:
a) The amount of direct damage measured in dollars.
b) The capacity of the local construction industry measured by the
dollars worth of construction annually within the market area. The larger the
construction activity, the greater is the potential to supply the increased
repair requirements resulting from a natural disaster.
The regional annual
volume of contract construction in dollars can be used to index local
construction capacity.
c) Unemployed labor force measured in the monthly wages that the
unemployed would draw if they had jobs. The greater the level of unemployment
of local construction workers, the greater is the local potential to supply
increased demands.
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d) Income distribution:
After a disaster, individuals with higher
incomes are more concerned about repairing their property quickly than they
are with repair prices. On the other hand, the poor cannot afford high repair
costs and can only wait until the prices come back down or ask the government
or some other group to finance the necessary repairs.
Knowledge of the
fractions of the affected population with incomes in various brackets thus
provides an indication of cost escalation potential.
3.

Health Impacts

Health impacts increase with the severity of the flood experience. Logue
(1978) and Melick (1976) found that persons whose homes had been flooded
perceived a more serious effect on their health than others in the same
community whose homes were not flooded.
The physiological wear-and-tear on
peop le exper ienc ing the flood ing of their homes reduces natural defenses
against illness. The flood group is more likely to be forced out into the wet
and cold, has greater economic concerns that may inhibit seeking help,
postpones attending to health problems, and is sicker when they finally seek
health care.
Parker (1977) reports that 25% of victims questioned 10 weeks after a
tornado reported deterioration in physical health, but only 11% indicated this
after 14 months had passed.
Takuma (1978) reported that many earthquake
victims complained of ill health after the quake, but the number decreased
over a 7-week period.
Faich and Rose (1979) found that hospital admissions
for myocardial infarction increased and mortality from all causes, especially
ischemic heart disease, increased in the five days following a blizzard.
Studies of postflood populations found longer durations of illnesses (Melick,
1976), and increased numbers of visits to general practitioners and hospitals
for a year following the flood (Abrahams, et aI, 1976).
4.

Psychological Impacts

Disasters may generate such psychological reactions as acute grief,
anxiety, anger, hostility, resentment, depression, and loss of ambition among
adults.
Marital and family discord, increased use of tranquilizers and
psychoactive medications, and excessive alcohol consumption have been
observed.
Children develop phobias, reoccurring sleep disturbances and
nightmares, and a lack responsibility. They lose interest in school.
Green et al. (985) found in a long-term study of psychological
impairment of survivors of the Beverly Hills supper club fire that differences
in an individual's experiences during the fire were significantly predictive
of their later psychological functioning.
Experiences such as bereavement,
life-threatening, extent of danger, time waiting to know status of friend or
loved one, and helping search and rescue affected the primary stress response
symptoms such as depres s ion, anxie ty, sleeplessness, social isolation,
suicide,
substance abuse, hostility, or belligerence.
Persons experiencing
bereavement or life-threatening experience showed more symptoms one year after
the fire than at two years.
Those experiencing searching and waiting
experiences maintained symptoms over a longer time, because of their. prolonged
uncertainty about the impact of experience.
Prolonged uncertainty of such
events as Three Mile Island also was shown to predict long-term impairment.
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One would also expect repair cost escalation to add to the mental
anguish.
People are forced to choose, for themselves and their families,
between continuing discomfort or paying for repairs at perceived exorbitant
cost s.
They have to deal with people of poor reputation or maybe just
different cultural roots. They may be taken economically while their personal
finances are at low ebb.
Accord ing to a report in Science News (1985), peop Ie li ving near Mount
St. Helens were still suffering emotional problems due to the volcano's
eruption five years earlier. Residents suffering significant property loss or
personal loss were nearly 12 times more likely than others to experience a
psychiatric disorder, and rates of mental disorders among women who
experienced such losses were about twice as high as for men. The intensity of
their reactions decreased in the second and third years after the eruption.
The major impact was caused by the flood which occurred as a result of the
eruption.
Another study showed increased mental disorders and stress
responses among residents in a town covered with volcanic ash.
Their stress
reactions lasted at least seven months.
Logue (1978) found that, five years after Hurricane Agnes, emotional and
physical distress lasted about a year longer with flood victims than in a
control group.
six months after the accident at Three Mile Island, nuclear plant workers
showed psychophysiological symptoms, anger, and extreme worry, primarily among
nonsupervisory workers, and especially those having preschool children (Sills
et aI, 1982). An NRC survey (Flynn, 1979) found symptoms of stress including
overeating, loss of appetite, difficulty in sleeping, feeling trembly or
shaky, trouble thinking clearly, irritability, and outbursts of extreme anger
which diminished over time.
T~tchener and Kapp (1976) state that more than 80% of a group of
survivors of the Buffalo Creek flood showed a traumatic neurotic syndrome, and
the symptoms and resulting character changes persisted for months, even years
after.
Almost all reported anxiety, grief, and despair.
The anxiety later
led to obsessions and phobias about water, wind, rain, and other reminders
that the disaster could reoccur. Not only have individuals been traumatized,
but the entire community.

Erikson (1976) states that loss of communality resulting from the Buffalo
Creek flood has impaired individuals' recovery as well.
Survivors not only
suffer demoralization because of personal loss, but because they have lost
their or perceive they have lost most of their moral anchors.
They were
scattered throughout the valley when relocated and felt great suspicion to
their new neighbors.
They perceive that relative strangers are less moral
than famB iar neighbors.
They suspec t breakdowns in morality such as
increased use of alcohol, that outsiders have not been able to substantiate.
Their sense of disorientation has continued for years after the disaster,
which is uncommonly long.
Erikson suggests this exceptional response occurred because the survivors
had few individual resources to cope because they had for so long used their
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abilities for the community, and didn't know how to use them for their own
needs. The community was stronger than the individuals.
It lost the quality
that gave power to the individuals to care, console, and protect each other in
disaster.
Gibbs and Levine (1982) discusses the long-term effects of stress from
the presence of a chronic hazard, namely toxic wastes from a landfill.
The
residents of Love Canal were evacuated several times, lost most of their
possessions due to fear of contamination, and forced to live in college
dormitories and motel s for extended period s.
Children exhibited behavioral
problems and marriages were strained.
There was fear of chromosomal damage,
cancer and other health problems from exposure to toxics.
President Carter
signed a bill to evacuate the families permanently from Love Canal due to
mental anguish.
Kinston and Rosser (1974) state that during the threat phase preceding a
disaster there seems to be a universal denial of the potential disaster as an
attempt to adapt to an unnatural situation. They site cases where evacuation
was minimal, such as the Hawaiian tsunami of May, 1960.
By not acknowledging
the threat, they avoid physical inconvenience and psychic distress.
During the init ial impact, the first major shock is to the individual,
whose feeling of personal invulnerability is suddenly reversed.
A second
major shock follows when the amount of destruction is realized.
Reactions
swing between terror and elation, invulnerability and helplessness,
abandonment and escape.
Their subsequent recovery from this shock depends on
whether the disaster was a "near miss" or a "remote miss", and on the actual
amount of loss experienced.
Panic is very rare, rather feelings of
helplessness or bewilderment, docility, and indecisiveness, among others,
which is the "disaster syndrome".
During the recoil after first impact, people often react with
hyperactivity, loss of efficiency, irrational behavior, and otherwise obtain
emotional release.
They are often obsessively preoccupied with the personal
implications of the event.
During the early aftermath fear and apprehension often persist, often due
to the idea that the disaster will reoccur (such as aftershocks in an
earthquake).
New disasters are fantasied and rumors rapidly spread, often
with the aid of the media.
Survivors have difficulty mourning their dead unless they know the bodies
have been identified, and their attempts to find missing persons often
interfere with relief operations.
The memory of the disaster persists, with the survivors often forced to
relive it over and over again. Often they feel regrets or recriminations over
actions taken before or during the disaster.
There are some therapeut ic fac tors in the d isas ter, such as the relief
that threats and dangers come from the outside.
The immediate needs are
obvious, immediate, and generally physical, such as food and shelter. Danger,
loss, and suffering are public and immediately present, so past and future are
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unimportant, and survivors who are not so badly affected feel relatively less
deprived.
Initially, people tend to give or accept help without restraint, but this
is followed by feelings of hostility, greed, suspicion, envy, and competition.
They resent relief organizations which give compensation based on need, not
losses.
Following destruction, people prefer to move back and rebuild.
This
seems to be due to feelings of fate, feelings that such events are random
occurrences, and that leaving will cause further disaster.
People may also
wish to repair the damage and master the event, or refuse to be scared away.
Very few move away, and those who do tend to for "neurot ic" reasons.
Melick et al (1982) discuss some characteristics and mediating variables
affecting the individual's reaction to disaster.
Whether a disaster is
natural or man-made, some events are accepted by victims as acts of God.
However, in other cases victims attach blame to someone or something, for
example the Bu ffalo Creek flood, Love Canal, and Three Mi le Island.
They
suggest that preventable disasters (such as a dam break due to human
negligence) may be more stressful than nonpreventable events.
The time factor associated with the impact of the disaster and recovery
is important with respect to the potential effect on the survivors' health.
Victims of Hurricane Agnes felt that the recovery period was about 18 months.
For an event such as Love Canal, where the threat was present for a much
longer period, long-term effects may endure much longer.
It is also important to distinguish between losses resulting from damages
that can be measured objectively and the stresses perceived during the event.
The Buffalo Creek flood had major impacts in both categories.
Three Mile
Island resulted in little objective loss but high perceived stress.
Ocher factors include whether the community is prepared for the event,
perhaps due to earlier disasters, whether evacuation is carried out on a large
scale, and whether the event seems to have an irrevocable effect on the
victim's life, such as Love Canal.
Carver and Scheier (1981) suggest that the relationship between prior
performances and future expectancies depends on whether the outcomes are
cont ingent on fac tors the person controls.
"Increments in expectancies
(following successes) or decrements in expectancy (following failure) were
greater and more frequent when the task was described as skill based than when
the task was described as chance based.
• prior performances affected
expectancies of future performances only when the outcomes were bel ieved to
have been determined internally." p. 189.
These outcome expectanc ies affect the way a person reacts to hazards.
People who perceive a discrepancy between a hazard and acceptable
environmental risk attempt to reduce the discrepancy if they have any hope of
success.
If their expectancies are unfavorable, people attempt to physically
withdraw from the situation. If that is not possible, they may have a sort of
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mental withdrawal as they think about other things,
hazard further, and avoid any reminders.

refuse to cons ider the

Carver and Scheier (1981) also emphasize that a person's outcome
expectancy determines his or her emotional reaction.
If a favorable
expectancy is viewed as a product of personal effort or abil ity, heightened
self-esteem results.
If it is viewed as resulting from outside help from
others or by luck, gratitude follows.
On the negative side, an expectancy
seen as a result of a person's own inadequacies or fail ings lowers sel festeem.
If the expectancy is perceived as caused by others, frustrations
commonly lead to anger and resentment.
Disasters are negative, and both of
these last two responses are commonly reported among their victims.
From these initial reactions, the feedback loops of control theory can be
extended to longer run applications to anxiety-related behavior.
In the
context of this study, one can consider the effects of the impact of a dambreak flood on behavior through the aftermath and recovery periods. Results
of two studies suggest that self-focus increases awareness of fear or anxiety
cues and interrupts normal activities. Responses to these interruptions seem
to be determined by the person's outcome expectancy. "Even with fear salient,
if expectancies are positive, the result is renewed efforts and concentration
on the goal.
If expectancies are negative, however, interruption leads to
withdrawal." p. 241.
Also, fears or anxieties lead to earlier withdrawal by persons who
perceive negative outcomes and tend to increase efforts by confident persons
with positive outcome expectancies. Thus, anxiety or fear can be facilitating
or debilitating.
However, some level of fear probably becomes debilitating
for even confident people."
although we have not experimentally
addressed the possibility, it may be that even relatively high levels of
anxiety are facilitating for people who are very confident." p. 228.
If people with low outcome expectancies cannot physically withdraw from a
hazard situation, they tend to experience mental withdrawal into thoughts or
perceptions irrelevant to their surroundings. This reduces their performance
or usefulness as functioning members of society. They work halfheartedly and
are easily interrupted by physical anxiety cues or frustrations in their
tasks.
Poor outcomes reinforce perceptions of an unfavorable expectancy,
cause further withdrawal, and lead people to focus on task-irrelevant
information.
One empirical data source for further work in this area would
be to study reactions and behavior during and after a catastrophic dam
failure.
5.

Preventative Response

There seem to be conflicting signals in the literature on how hazard
experience affects the performance of subsequent mitigation measures.
In
invest igat ing the rel at ionsh i p be tween att itudes towards hurricanes and
hurricane adjustments, Baker and Patton (1974) found that experience with past
hazards was strongly related to successful preventative actions.
(Comment:
probably also to reduced personal and community trauma.
In fact one could
hypothesize trauma and lack of training as the primary contributors to
inefficient actions during catastrophes.)
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Saarinen (1979) discusses the linkage between prior hazard experience and
subsequent mit igation measures.
People can be mis led by limited or biased
experience. Saarinen uses an example to illustrate this point.
"In investigations following Hurricane Camille, which struck the
Mississippi Coast in 1969, it was found that many people assessed their safety
according to memories of an earlier smaller storm which stuck in 1947. This
may have been a fatal mistake for many as most among the 123 dead were drowned
while trying to ride out the storm in a residence near the water front." (p.
2, 1979). (Comment:
In our terminology, disaster experiences may lull people
into complacency against subsequent catastrophe.)
Carter, Clar.k and Leik (1979), in a study of response to hurricane
warnings, found that prior experience with hazard situations did not enhance
either preparedness or evacuation under warning.
In a later study, Carter
(1979) found that people without hurricane experience evacuate earl ier than
those who have experienced a hurricane.
The latter group waits for firm
confirmat ion of the necessity for evacuation.
Clark and Carter (1980) note
that experience with hurricanes raises "threshold" levels, that is, the body
of evidence required before one is satisfied that evacuation is necessary.
(Connnent:
Experiences may also include realization of event magnitude
variability, unnecessary evacuations, personal or neighbor losses to looters,
or difficulties in returning to implement repairs.)
The logic generally used in setting policy for government programs to
help to infl uence people exposed to natural hazards is (Baumann and Sims,
1980):
1) provide information on the risk and education on proper mitigation
measures; 2) such information will make the public under threat aware of the
nature of the risk and the opt ions that they have for doing something to
reduce their losses; and 3) such awareness will result in the public under
threat adopting protective measures. Records of past events indicate that is
does not necessarily follow that distributed information will cause the public
to know what to do and do what it should.
Reasons for breakdown in this
conventional logic are given by Saarinem (1979) and Mi1eti et al. (1975).
In studying the warning systems for tornadoes, flash floods and
hurricanes, Carter (1979) found that at least one-third of the public does not
automatically follow official announcements.
However, 90 percent will
evacuate if they are convinced an event is serious. Hence a major task of a
warning system is to convince skeptics.
In interviewing families who were
ultimately evacuated in the 1965 Denver floods, Drabek and Stephenson (1971)
found that many of them interpreted the official broadcast warnings simply as
"information." They felt that something as serious as the need to evacuate
would be personally connnunicated to them in some way other than by radio or
TV.
Baumann and Sims (1980) have provided some insights and directions on
warnings:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

The
The
The
The
The

warning must be clear;
warning must convey an appropriate response;
warning must be perceived as coming from a credible source;
warning must be reinforced socially at the local level;
medium used to disseminate the warning is important; and,
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6.

The type of appeal must be considered and assessed.

Quarantelli and Dynes (1972) discuss common beliefs and perceptions about
social behavior during natural disasters which do not appear to be valid, but
which are often considered when officials are planning for anticipated
disasters.
a.
Panic flight.
Due to fears of people panicking, officials put out
warning bulletins cautiously or at the last minute.
Media often reports
entire communities fleeing on approach of a flood or hurricane. Actually the
majority of inhabitants usually do not leave - it is usually tourists and
transients who flee.
Also most evacuations are orderly, with people helping
others to get away.
In the face of a flood threat in Denver in 1965, 92% of
families who left together.
In evacuating Three Mile Island an estimated 74 to 90% stayed with
friends and relatives.
The median distance traveled was 85 to 100 miles.
About 180 stayed at the official evacuation center during one day, although as
many as 800 may have stayed there for a short time. At one time, there were
more reporters than evacuees at the center (Sills et al. 1982).
During Hurricane Carla in 1961, over 500,000 people left their homes, but
although there was at least four days warning, most residents never left their
home.
About 35% stayed in their homes and 22 percent wi th fr iend sand
relatives.
In a New England city hit by two hurricanes in succession, only
about 4% evacuated.
U.S. News and World Report (1985) report that people along the coast
tended to stay in their homes during hurricanes until Camille killed 256 in
1969.
Since then most states passed mandatory evacuat ion laws that allowed
police to arrest the foolhardy.
During Hurricane Elena, officials in
Louisiana ordered evacuations three times over a four-day period with most of
the population responding. Fewer than 15 out of 1500 inhabitants of Dauphin
Island, Alabama, refused to move the mainland.
It has been hit by three
hurricanes in the last 16 years, and inhabitants continue to rebuild.
b. Shock.
Only in a minority of cases do victims exhibit a shock
reaction, usually apathy.
This is generally short-lived and only seems to
occur in the aftermath of sudden, violent disaster.
c. Help.
Disaster victims react immediately to their plight, first
seeking help from family and friends, then from churches or other similar
groups.
If not available, then victims seek help from more impersonal
official organizations, police or welfare departments. Only as a last resort
do they turn to the Red Cross or civil-defense agencies.
Quarantel1i and Dynes (1972) found that during the 1971 earthquake in San
Fernando, California, when over 80,000 had to evacuate homes downstream of
weakened dams, fewer than 7% sought housing aid from public agencies. During
the large evacuation preceding Hurricane Carla, more than 75% went to otherthan-public shelters.
In a flood in Yuba City and Marysville, California,
less than 20% went to the 38 Red Cross shelters available in 13 towns in the
disaster area.
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d.
During the 1953 tornado in Flint, Michigan, persons in the disaster
area rescued and took to hospitals between 2/3 and 3/4 of the over 900
casualties within three to four hours and without significant aid from formal
organizations.
Even in large disasters, most victims never come in contact
with outside agencies.
e. Outside agencies tend to underestimate local resources and flood a
disaster area with unneeded supplies.
There are usually more than enough
volunteers, so much so that they cannot be effectively used.
This often
overwhelming response of volunteers from outside the immediate disaster area
is known as convergence.

f.
There is very little evidence that wide-scale looting occurs.
However, most victims perceive that looting occurs, even when it cannot be
substantiated.
This is due to rumors - They heard of others' property being
stolen.
g.
Time.
In the initial period after disaster, differences of class,
rank, and age are unimportant as people work side by side to rescue injured
and clear debris. Morale may be high. People compare their losses to others'
losses and to what might have happened.
However, the heightened sense of
communi ty creates a wall that excludes outsiders with needed ski lls and
reso·urces such as Red Cross rescue teams.
i.
The media tend to exaggerate disaster impacts.
Orderly evacuations
are reported as persons fleeing in near-panic. Officials usually overestimate
losses of life and property.
Reports focus on destruction and despair or on
unusually tragic aspects, which may be true but are not representative.
In
the Alaska earthquake, initial est imates circulating in Columbus Ohio were
1000 dead in Anchorage alone; Chicago papers estimated 500 dead; in Seattle it
was 300; and in Anchorage it was 100. The actual number of deaths was 7.
Danzig et al (1958) studied the effect of a threatening rumor on a
community
which experienced a major flood.
After flood waters receded,
people returned to their homes to clean up.
A day after a rumor that water
was coming over the dam upstream was received over the radios on the firetrucks used to pump out residences and was rapidly spread by word-of-mouth and
phone.
Nearly a third of those who heard the rumor fled, with 90% of those
who lived in the area of town already flooded. Officials delayed action until
it was verified false, and then transmitted the news to local radio stations
and directly to the public.
Several denials of the rumor had to be broadcast
before people would return.
j .
heroic.
decency.

Disaster victims like to pass off their experiences as atypical and
Stories of loot ing and exploitat ion reinforce their own sense of
They act as a necessary counterpoint to the reality of the event.

The psychological impact of disaster may be minimized by a willingness to
admit the possibility of the disaster occurring yet also maintain a belief in
survival. Anticipation or worrying about the coming event can reduce the risk
of being overwhelmed by the event.
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Green et al (1985) suggest that a person's individual disaster experience
is a good indicator of future psychological functioning ~ while Pearl in and
Schooler (1978) have identified factors which predict how persons will cope
with stress.
Those with higher education and income show better coping
ability, probably because they have access to more effective coping
techn iques.
Men do better than women ~ for personality characteristics and
response repertoires shown to have some effect in controlling stress are found
predominantly in men.
No significant overall difference was found between
young and old.
This information may be used predicted reactions to risk before an event,
allowing identification of persons likely to need clinical care, or be used to
predict mental health outcomes for specific events.
Kinston and Rosser (974) suggest that specialized psychiatric skills
could be useful in all phases of a disaster.
This is rarely done and
interventions by psychiatrists are actively resisted in the early phases by
other helpers and by the victims in the later phases.
It is not known what
priority psychiatric help should have relative to other relief.
However in
Yugoslavia the psychological impact of disaster is considered in planning
relief services.
Apart from convent ional methods for treatment of individuals, there is
not much information on special problems in treating on the corrnnunity level
where there is prevalent death, disablement, material loss, and bereavement.
The authors feel that an obvious ro Ie for psychiatrists would be to set up
groups to help the community work through its shared experiences
constructively.
Kinston and Rosser (974) also suggest that all responsible persons
involved in disaster relief should understand psychological first-aid in order
to establish effective human contact with disturbed or upset survivors.
Separations of loved ones should be prevented.
To minimize confusion,
anxiety, and guilt, processes such publishing lists of dead and injured,
establishing effective communication and information centers, and que 11 ing
rumors must be accelerated.
Also, compet it ion between reI forgan izat ions
should be dealt with quickly.
This will reduce the often experienced
hostility of victims to relief agencies.
Omohundro (1982) found that after an oil spill in the St. Lawrence River,
residents were as disturbed by the lengthy cleanup as they were by the
pollutant itself.
When asked what aspect of the spill they found most
upsetting~ 24% of the answers concerned quality of the cleanup, the money
spent, the leaders of the cleanup, and other items directly related to the
relief operation, while only 14% mentioned factors related directly to the
pollution of the environment. There was much overlapping and gaps in federal,
state, and local government organizat ions involved result ing in con fus ion
about responsibility. Elected officials and government agencies received the
most negative rating of oil spill participants from respondents.
Providing
and man a gin g pu b I i c in form a t ion was a c r it i c a I but d i f fi cuI t t ask,
consequences included conflicting perceptions, rumor epidemics, incorrect
referrals for information, and ultimately a decline in morale.
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Due to the fact that it is important to respond to oil spills with
maximum speed, the relief agencies generally act independently of the oil
spill society. Thus, victims become alienated from the relief agency that is
supposed to help them.
The Coast Guard was often blamed for many of the
difficulties, even for the accident itself. The Coast Guard was in charge of
almost all available compensation to the victims and were suspected of
arbitrary judgments, using biased criteria, and bending to political pressure.
This created feelings of hostility and anger in the victims.
Barton (1969) discusses the capacity of formal organizations to deal with
the great amount of decision and administrative work in the aftermath of a
disaster.
In several cases ad hoc groups were set up to bypass local
government and coordinate the efforts of outside relief organizations, local
offices, and volunteers. (Comment: These plans seem oriented toward a local
disaster than the catastrophes and supper catastrophes examined here. Many of
the same prine iples apply, but greater geograph ic al se para t ion wou ld be
preferable.
We should also give greater thought to the susceptibility of
computer software and data banks to the types of forces leashed by natural
disaster. How should these be stored for better protection?)
6.

Disaster Planning by Businesses

Dissmeyer (1983) describes the management response to a fire that gutted
the Norwest Bank building in Minneapolis on Thanksgiving Day 1982.
By
implement ing a disaster cont ingency plan devised months before, all vital
records were preserved intact. Basic services were provided to the public the
next day, and all major functions were brought back to normal within a week,
although they were housed in temporary quarters.
An article in Management
Review (1983) states that the cost of preparing the contingency plan for the
Norwest Bank was about $27,000.
A management policy committee oversaw everything. Copies of transaction
data were transferred daily to an operations center several blocks away, and
another backup system kept dupl icates of these. Vendors flew in replacement
equipment (microcomputers, word processors, commun icat ions gear, etc.) over
the weekend. Customers were informed through the media of alternate locations
for banking services. Some 300,000 square feet of temporary office space was
located and leased.
The authors recommend the following contingency plan features:
Prepare for a wide range of disasters - earthquake, flood, fire, tornado,
power failure, civil disorders.
Preserve the integrity of the processes, not just individual items, and
make sure that departmental plans fit together.
Have sufficient detail so key managers know who does what and how to
reach them.
Spell out priorities as ranked by someone or a committee.
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Involve every department from the ear 1 iest stages when

formulat ing the

plan.
Update the plan regularly.
(Comment:
These descript ions fit disasters better than catastrophes as
being considered here. One can wonder what additional features would be added
for dealing with a true catastrophe.)
Colby (1985) quotes John Nugent, senior consultant at Norwest Bank, as
stating that a Texas study showed that, of companies which experience
disaster, 43% never reopen, and 29% of those who do reopen are closed again
within 2 years.
Some 95% of the businesses having disaster recovery plans
failed to test them in advance. Norwest spent $55,000 to get paper documents
cleaned by a salvage vendor.
The Office of the Comptroller of Currency issued Banking Circular 177 in
1983 required the CEO and directors of each national bank to have contingency
plans and evaluate them annually for adequacy. The outcome is to be recorded
annually in the minutes of the annual meeting.
Campbell (1985) credits the
Norwest fire and the power blackout in New York in 1983 as events causing
bus iness managers nat ionwide to th ink seriously about disaster cont i ngency
planning.
John Nugent (personal communicat"ion) stated that a recent survey by Chubb
and Sons Insurance Company showed that 91% of the businesses that suffered a
data processing center disaster went out of business within five years. Also,
the Management Information Systems Research Center at the University of
Minnesota performed a study in 1978 on the effect of a data processing center
disaster on various types of businesses. Banks had a tolerance level of only
2 days without data processing facilities before they experienced a
significant loss of business. Insurance companies could tolerate 4 weeks to a
month, and manufacturing industries fell in between.
Campbell describes three necessary levels of protection:
1. Identification of the major business functions so that provision can
be made for continuing each one with minimum disruption.
2.
Regular technical backup of important business information by
duplicating files and databases and arranging for a standby facility to
provide processing during an emergency or disaster. Using microcomputers
complicates baCkup and recovery, since most data and software ~s not
properly safeguarded for baCkup.
3. Planning to preserve the major networking-hardware (automatic teller
machines; fund transfer mechanisms; brokerage services; voice, data, and
facsimile communications).
From the general management perspective, a business should examine the
potential impact of the disaster on revenue loss, additional expenses, loss of
customer confidence, and legal liabilities. Also, many banks use other banks,
financial service organizations, or service bureaus to support their business;
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and these may become unavailable.
Banks generally show a high level of
interest but so far most contingency plans are confined to the technical
aspects of computer processing.
Their lack of concern for major business
func t ions show a sc al ing weakness analogous to governments that review
potential damages to their facilities but give lesser consideration to
preserving their fundamental functions.
Comment:
These plans seems more oriented toward a local disaster than
the catastrophes and super catastrophes examined here.
Many of the same
principles apply, but greater geographical separation would be preferable. We
should also give greater thought to the suscept ibil ity of computer so ftware
and data banks to the types of forces leased by natural disaster. How should
these be stored for better protection?
The ABA Banking Journal (1985) discusses two disasters striking
individual banks.
A tornado destroyed a bank in Barneveld, Wi sconsin on a
Friday.
A banker. from a neighboring town called vendors and fellow bankers
and over the weekend gathered resources so that the bank could open on Monday
for business in a rented trailer.
The second case concerned a bank in Galveston hit by a hurricane in 1983.
When a hurricane standby was issued, outside signs were removed, generators
checked, and inventory taken of emergency items such as flashlights. When a
hurricane warning was issued, computers were shut down, windows taped, and
safe deposit boxes oiled to prevent rusting due to high humidity.
Advertising Age (985) reports earthquake impacts on Mexican business.
Tourism was hard hit by travelers' anxieties.
Ad agencies were hurt as
clients cut back advertising budgets in order to rebuild.
Newspapers
temporarily lost revenues from movie ads amount to 2 or 3 full pages daily.
Most of the ad agencies are U. S. controlled or dominated, and the U. S. home
offices organized relief efforts.
Chemical Week (983) discusses the effect of a flood in Louisiana on
shippers.
Shipments were delayed a day or more because a major railroad
trestle was washed away and flood-swollen rivers slowed barge progress and
raised tow rates.
Railroa~s had to reroute, and delays caused extra charges
there too.
Chemical feedstocks were brought in by truck as the major roads
were still open, but highway transport is much more costly.
Industry Week (1982) discusses southern Italy's attempt to rebuild after
the Naples earthquake caused significant damage to 1449 businesses with 100 or
more employees.
There is hope of a rebirth of industry including advanced
plants in energy, light transport, and telecommunications.
Signi ficant natural disasters seem to inspire a higher concern for
disaster contingency planning by businesses.
After major hurricanes and
earthquakes, business and industrial journals often publish articles on
emergency preparedness and planning. An articles in Factory (1961) discusses
the lessons learned in the aftermath of Hurricane Carla.
Some large
manufacturers, such as Westinghouse, had workers flown in from other parts of
the country (New York and Denver, in Westinghouse's case) to aid in cleanup
and recovery of vital equipment. They also obtained equipment and replacement
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parts from large equipment manufacturers before the hurricane struck.
West inghouse sent motors to 20 different shops located as far as 300 miles
away for repair. They also made commitments to such service shops before the
storm struck.
An article in Iron Age (Starin 1962) suggests utilizing retired workers
for fill-in duties, providing alternate headquarters, establishing reporting
centers for employees away from plants, and joining mutual aid associations
for pooling equipment and personnel.
Weimer (977) also suggests that any
contingency plan should include mechanisms to provide local officials with
ready estimates of damages and the portion not covered by insurance in order
to justify state or federal assistance.
Davis (1973), in an article prompted by Hurricane Agnes, tells of a free
course offered by the Defense civil Preparedness Agency in industry and
business emergency planning.
He also urges that businesses' emergency plans
become a part of the community emergency plans and that they get involved with
the community planning.
7.

Rebuilding and Relocation

Kinston and Rosser (1974) state that following destruction, people prefer
to move back and rebuild.
Very few move away, and those who do tend to for
"neurotic" reasons. Examples include Managua, now rebuilt for the third time
after earthquakes destroyed it.
Th is seems to be due to feelings of fate,
feelings that such events are random occurrences, and that leaving will cause
further disaster.
People may also wish to repair the damage and master the
event, or refuse to be scared away (or preserve social relationships, e.g.
Buffalo Creek).
Nineteen percent of all respondents to an NRC survey (Flynn, 1979) said
they had considered moving (30% within a five-mile radius).
However, as of
end of July, 1979, less than three-tenths of 1 percent had moved due to the
accident. Many families report stress and continuing threat, but few are so
concerned as to relocate.
A report in U.S. New & World Report (985) states that for most
communities hit by a natural disaster, it takes only a year or two to rebuild
completely.
According to James Morentz, author of Hazard Monthly, a journal
on disaster relief, local and private funds typically provide two to three
times more aid than the federal government.
Fort Wayne, Indiana, hit by
flooding in 1982, implemented flood-control measures while rebuilding and when
hit by a major flood in 1985, suffered little damage.
In Johnstown, PA,
however, hit by a flood in 1977, relief efforts suffered from duplication and
disorganization, causing resentment among victims. Some areas may never come
back. The Brownwood subdivision in Baytown, Texas, hit by Hurricane Alice in
1983 was hit so badly it had to be abandoned.
During World War II, most of Warsaw was destroyed.
Ciborowski (1964)
writes that of 957 historical buildings, 782 were completely demolished, 141
part ially destroyed, and 34 remained.
An important provis ion in the plan to
rebuild Warsaw stated that all destroyed monuments of the past and relics of
material and cultural progress, such as churches, cathedrals, the Royal
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Palace, and the Old Town were to be restored, at the same time adapting them
to modern ways of living. Berlin's central areas, including most of the slum
districts, were also hard hit during war time bombing. Modern, safe housing
was rebuilt, and new factories as well (Armstrong, 1973)
Rebuilding is not always for the better. Torry (1978) cites the case of
Managua, Nicaragua, where thousands of low and middle-income houses were built
with help of outside aid. Due to credit bottlenecks and skyrocketing prices
uncontrolled by officials, most of poor could not afford to buy them so many
stood empty.
Houses were undesirable to middle-income because of location,
small size, and repetitive rows of houses.
This phenomenon has occurred in urban renewal attempts.
Hays (1985)
reports that there was great pressure from opponents to public housing to
locate new units in areas already occupied by the poor, putting a stigma on it
which was further increased by construction of new projects in slum areas.
Any family with ambitions of upward mobility would avoid "the projects", even
though the rent was cheap. Therefore the most economically deprived and those
attracted to the projects as an excellent place to commit crimes were left,
leading to inevitable deterioration.
8.

Relationship Between Probable Maximum Precipitation (PMP) and Area
R=

ID

[a +

IA ~

C

] ; Fletcher (1950)

in which:
R

=

rainfall depth

A

=

area

D

=

rainfall duration

a

=

the shift of the axl.S of rainfall divided by II)

b

=

parameter representing the particular hyperbola chosen for the
fit t ing

C

=

the shift of the axis of square root of area

For U.S, rainfalls, FLetcher found the following relationship:
R=ID[0.5+

IA

266
+ 19.2

where R is in inches; D is in hours; and A is in square miles.
The above equation is valid for A up to 200,000 square miles.
Horton (1924) gave the depth area relationship as:

p

n

= Po e- KA
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in which

P

=

the average depth of rainfall for a given duration

A

=

area

Po

=

the highest amount at the center of the storm

K,n

=

constants for a given storm.

Using storm data of five great northern storms, Horton (1924) found that the
24-hour rainfall amount could be represented by
P = 16 e

-0.0883 AO. 24

and for five great southern storms by

-

p

22 e

-0.112 AO. 25
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